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Originally posted by 6145060:
At least they died having fun.

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Originally posted by 6145060:
At least they died having fun.

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Originally posted by 14219531:
Strange currents develope under the ice that are very unpredictable.

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Originally posted by 14219531:
I suspect the last feeling they had was that of desperation as they attempted to resolve the situation without the time to do so.

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Each diver eventually departed the surface with over 60 pounds of weight (including lead shot and steel tank). As a diver descends, air compresses and at a depth of 33 feet, its volume decreases by 50%. Therefore, to maintain buoyancy, the diver must add air to the BCD or dry suit during any descent. Thus, an overweighted diver may be able to control his or her buoyancy on the surface, but enter an uncontrolled descent only a few feet from the surface.
….
Depth gauges revealed that LT Hill had descended to 187 feet, and BM2 Duque had exceeded the maximum gauge reading of 200 feet, and was pegged at a maximum point on the gauge that corresponded to a depth of approximately 220 feet.
…
The air in BM2 Duque's air tank was depleted. LT Hill's air tank had a pressure of 90 psi, essentially rendering it empty.

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Originally posted by johca:

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Originally posted by 14219531:
Strange currents develope under the ice that are very unpredictable.

Did you make the effort to read the accident report? Currents were not a significant direct or indirect cause or influence in the accident being discussed.

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Originally posted by 14219531:
I suspect the last feeling they had was that of desperation as they attempted to resolve the situation without the time to do so.

No need to suspect, the situation and circumstances provided sufficient time for the divers to be in duress. Both diver’s air tanks were empty, the air was either breathed out of them or the air was used in attempt to attain buoyancy and ascent.

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Each diver eventually departed the surface with over 60 pounds of weight (including lead shot and steel tank). As a diver descends, air compresses and at a depth of 33 feet, its volume decreases by 50%. Therefore, to maintain buoyancy, the diver must add air to the BCD or dry suit during any descent. Thus, an overweighted diver may be able to control his or her buoyancy on the surface, but enter an uncontrolled descent only a few feet from the surface.
….
Depth gauges revealed that LT Hill had descended to 187 feet, and BM2 Duque had exceeded the maximum gauge reading of 200 feet, and was pegged at a maximum point on the gauge that corresponded to a depth of approximately 220 feet.
…
The air in BM2 Duque's air tank was depleted. LT Hill's air tank had a pressure of 90 psi, essentially rendering it empty.

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At least they died having fun.

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Originally posted by 16391585:
First of all, 99% of this is incorrect.
My mom works on that ship, she was there when it happend.

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Originally posted by johca:

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Originally posted by 16391585:
First of all, 99% of this is incorrect.
My mom works on that ship, she was there when it happend.

Unfortunately regardless of what position your mom works on the ship, being a mom lacks any underwater diver qualifications.

The criteria for assigning responsibility and blame requires determining who was responsible for deed or act causing the outcome. The lack of equipment being serviceable and properly inspected and working order wasn’t the direct cause for this accident. The primary direct cause of this accident is negligence, incompetence and reckless judgment of the dive officer planning the dive and who presented it for final approval to the ship’s Captain (Commanding Officer).

The secondary direct cause of this accident is lack of proficiency and qualifications of the divers to perform this planned diving operation and their reckless judgment to dive with use of improper equipment configuration and unsafe diving practices.

The Diving Officer’s primary responsibility is the safe conduct of all diving operations. These duties bring with it responsibility of obtaining and sustaining through understanding of all safety regulations and diving manuals pertinent to conducting a dive or a series of dives.

Diving Officer duties does not necessarily require or indicate possession of qualification to supervise or be in charge of an actual diving operation for a particular dive or series of dives. Appointment as Dive Supervisor is typically based on seniority of available qualified diver personnel of demonstrated ability and experience. None of the divers possessed any reasonable measure of experience or qualifications to perform diving supervisor duties.

What killed the two divers wasn’t that the equipment wasn’t inspected and properly maintained in five years. The cause of the deaths was the nonperformance of duties and incompetence of the Dive Officer and the degree of deviation from standards of caution regarding equipment requirements and safety all three divers voluntarily decided on doing. There was no mission or operations requirement for this dive. A training need didn’t justify the dive being done when training records put in question the experience and qualification of the divers to safely accomplish cold water dives in such a remote and unfamiliar area.

This dive accident cannot be attributed to someone not wanting to approve purchase of better or newer equipment or pay for equipment maintenance. To do so would require the Dive Officer being completely unaware duty responsibilities include verifying qualifications and safe diving practices of all divers assigned to the Healy. The particulars of putting blame on such reason would also require Dive Officer being completely unaware duty responsibilities include ensuring all diving equipment used by divers on the Healy is properly configured, in good repair, well maintained, and correctly stowed.

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Originally posted by SUNLINER81:
I'm not sure why we are discussing it again...
Respectfully, SUNLINER81

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Both were Navy trained, and considered seasoned divers.