My opinion of course....

Where Lee excelled: Defensive positions where he could use internal lines of communication with the use of small spoiling counterattacks.

He was very agressive in reactions to Federal troop distributions and movements...an ative defense. Once he came out of the trenches, he failed miserably. Besides very bad decision making at Gettysburg, Sharpsburg demonstrates a fully flawed strategical grasp. The Confederate Army was placed in a very precarious position that allowed isolation and possible destruction. Had it been Grant instead of lil Mac, you can bet that advantage would be pressed and taken.

Lee also seemed to have lady luck next to him.
That helps alot too.

Lee actually surprised Grant at the onstart of Wilderness 2. Grant did not think that Lee could move quick enough (audacity) to inhibit the federal advance through the Wilderness. Grant wanted a quick passage through this area to gain maneuver rooma. Lee moved his Corps to block that passage on favorable defensive ground. Hence, the Battle of the Wilderness Two.

But Grant surprised Lee too. Lee understoon the generals he faced before, but was perplxed with Grant. Unlike those before him, Grant was both agressive and determined. After the first clash, Grant did not go away as Lee thought he would. Grant's objective was not Richmond or any other geographical spot. It was clear to him: the destruction of Lee's combat power and ability to make war. Like operations before, Grant re-analyzed the situation; took account of the factors; and proceeded to do the job at hand. If Smith would have walked into Petersburg after crossing the James (Lee was still watching 50% of Grant while thinking it was 100%), Lee would have had three COAs against this rear attack:

1) Stay and Starve
2) An Appomatix Type Campaign 1 year earlier
3) Turn 180 and attack thru Richmond to open communications/supply to the rest of the Confederacy...with Grant now in their rear and left flank.

Grant always looked attack the rear of a position. At least when he was in command of concept and the conduct of operations. When I look at his operations in the West, it becomes very clear that he has an operational common sense and insight what the link-pins of a major objective was. Donnelson to Tennessee; Jackson to Vicksburg, etc. As Lee had his traits, so did Grant in how they thought/planned.



Differences:
Lee was a dreamer of what could be.
Grant was a doer of what could be done.

Lee often was not apt to focus the tactical means to the stragetic ends. Grant strove to employ tactical means meet stragetic goals.

Where Lee

yes youve hit a bone here. at sharpsburg lee had fewer then 21 thousand men. were as mcllelean had 86 thousand. i also contend that this was mclleleans count. he in reality had no fewer then 90 thousand. when your major general d h hill leads an assault with 50 men and checks 1500. you know that the union cant fight. this was a minority political fight. had the south realized this sooner then more effort would have gone into wacking the tyrranical northern congressmen. back to sharpsburg. when one side advances into a cornfeild one man wide and 75 deep and decimates two whole brigades then you know the north sucked when it came to fighting. lets see,,,,, grant being a good general........... how bout how he let washington be taken. ewell sucked too. it was wide open for the sacking and the end of the war.

283

What in hell are you talking about?

Since the official records say the Confederate casualty total was 10.7k, the ANV lost over 50%?

Numbers of Confederate were over 40,000, Federals were about 87,000.

I always thought Hill had a Division and not a Platoon. And...a single file of 75 men....come on. Stop playing with your plastic soldiers. I think you should do some reading and a bit of retaining what history is recorded. What you posted above is pure fantasy.

quote:

...the north sucked when it came to fighting.

Tell that to the Iron Brigade, the Irish Brigade, the Vermont Brigade, Hancock's 2nd Corps, Sykes's Division of Regulars, the Pennsylvania Reserves and a host of other superb Union organizations that proved themselves time and time again on countless battlefields.

Let me establish my bona fides before making what many may consider a rash statement.

I am a Southerner, born and bred. I am from the deep South and come from a time when the words Lincoln, Grant and Sherman were always accompanied by a profanity. The day I graduated from High School in 1968 I started growing my first beard--not as part of the counterculture but as an homage to Lee, Jackson and Stuart. Now....

The South could not under any circumstances ever have defeated the Union. The North could and almost did defeat itself through its choice of incompetent commanders. Fortunately for the North it was strong enough to afford to be defeated over and over again in the East.

The South exerted itself to its fullest to mobilise its manpower. The North countered by mobilising 2 to 3 times the manpower and never ever came close to its own 100% capability. Plus the North could tap into the flood of immigration whereas the South had nothing comparable to use.

The North had the industrial advantage to produce the weapons of war, not only numerically but qualitatively as well. While the South could capture or purchase abroad (fewer and fewer as the war continued and the blockade improved), the North could move from simply manufacturing more of the same to introducing new and improved types of weapons as the Sharpes and Spencers. Several battles hinged on the presence of these new weapons to preserve a Union victory or prevent a Union defeat.

The North had a Navy in being and rapidly became a force capable of enforcing the blockade and projecting its force whereever the North desired both on the seacoasts or in riverine operations.

The North possessed a magnificent rail system which got better and better, giving lie to the supposition that the South had the advantage of operating on interior lines. The North could shuttle its troops around the South faster than the South could move its own men through the South.

Geography favored the North. Except for that tiny area between Richmond and DC, the South was bi-sected by river systems. The Ohio formed an almost impenetrable barrier protecting the Northern heartlands, while the Mississippi, Tennessee, and Cumberland rivers provided daggers to thrust into the heart of the South. A true triple whammy an inviting river system with a powerful Navy to operate on it with a numerically superior Army.

Only in the Richmond/DC belt does geography favor the South. The river systems run E-W and are barriers to Northern invasion not a help. The road options are strictly limited and in conjuntion with forests and mountains give the defender huge advantages.

Now for a second "rash" statement. Robert E Lee never defeated any of the opponents he faced. Not Pope; not Burnside; not Hooker; not Meade; not Grant; not even George B(Swift my feet to flee) McClelland were beaten on the field fo battle. As a case in point at Fredericksburg, Burnside after having successfully eluded Lee could have crossed the river unopposed and occupied Marye's Heights and did not. When he did open the battle the majority of the Army of the Potomac sat on the north side of the river and never fired a shot. Nor with Lee concentrated at Fredericksburg did he use these men to make multiple crossings to get in Lee's rear and flank.

If then victory was impossible for the South and Bobby Lee never won a victory, then
WHY ARE WE EVEN HAVING THIS DISCUSSION??????

So here is my answer to the main question: the best general of the CW was--
1. Lee
2. Grant
3. Meade

I really don't see where there could be any dispute over this ranking. Lee has to rated number one because without his specific contributions the war would have been over at least 3 years earlier with a quick and easy Northern walkover. Outside of the DC/Richmond corridor the chronicles of the CW is a litany of Southern defeat after defeat after defeat.

Lee had the uncanny ability to read the mind and character of his opponent and the ability to make him feel defeated. There was no reason for McClelland after Malvern Hill not to simply take a deep breath and renew his offensive. Ditto for him at Antietam. Lee's opposites were defeated mentally by the legend in the making before the fighting started.

Furthermore the geography which the North found so limiting seemed unimportant to Lee. He seemed to be able to invade the North seemingly at will, penetrating deep into enemy territory with impunity. Far from being a disasterous decision, Lee's first invasion sans the utterly improbable lost order would have been considered a masterpiece of the military art. Even accepting battle against such enormous odds could be considered an acceptable risk, given the character of his opponent and the potential gain of defeating the enemy on his own territory. And while he came close to defeat he also came close to an improbable victory.

What of Grant? Prior to coming East his accomplishments would entitle him to at least 2nd place. Forts D & H, Shiloh, Vicksburg, Chattanooga all brilliantly conducted. Or even if you want to minimize his mental acuity, then let it be said that if he was not the brightest bulb on the block, then he did know one thing, the most important thing which was I got more men than they do and all I gotta do is to keep on fighting.

When he came East he was smart enough to realize Meade's value and retain him. He was also smart enough not to forget what he had learned in the West--I'm bigger than he is and I can out last him.

Now it really irks me to hear that Grant had a revelation that his goal was Lee's Army not Richmond. Lee was not exactly a ghost. If you wanted to find him all you had to do was aim for Richmond over the same raods that all of USG's predecessors had travelled. First result: the Wilderness. After losing there what was his next step--a flank attack to get between Lee and Richmond. At each step along the way of the Overland Campaign be it Cold Harbor, Spottsyvania, etc. and even beyond after crossing the James and headng toward Petersburg the pattern remained the same--assault and flank.

Here is Grant's real genius and the key to his success. By continuing the advance and comiong ever closer to Richmond he pinned Lee to a geographic location and turned a war of mobility into static trench warfare, using his strength against Lee's weakness.

So Scutarii Grant did not force Lee out of defensive positions he forced him into defensive postions. Furthermore Scutarii Grant cannot complain about being saddled with incompetent subordinates like Ben Butler, Smith, or Burnside because for every political general he had to put up with Lee had the same problem--on a sick day AP Hill could be as bad as he was good when healthy and Lee unlike Grant had to soft soap a President who thought himself a master strategist.

I also would like to take issue with Grant's master strategic plan to coordinate attacks all over the South simultaneously. The implication is that this would deny the South the ability to coordinate a defense by shuttling men from one zone to another as needed. This is a pretty weak strategy given the fact that in the entire war there was only one such transfer, ie. when Longstreet was sent west for Chicamauga. And secondly the simultaneous advances did not go so well. The Red River campaign ended in disaster. Sherman really did not begin to achieve real successes until Hood replaced Johnston. I would have loved to see what Johnston could have done at the Battle of Peachtree Creek. My bet is that he would hve probably wiped out a sizeable portion of Sherman's army and not squandered the opportunity like Hood.

Between Lee and Grant--why did I choose Lee? Let me make it simple for you. What if they had changed places? How would Lee have done at the head of the Army of the Potomac and Grant leading the Army of NV? Does the war last beyond 1862?

Finally, why Meade? Simple, he's the only Union commander who can look God in the eye and say I beat Bobby Lee in a fair fight (Gettysburg). No later than Fredericksburg the Army of the Potomac had come of age. They were well trained, well equiped, well led at the divisional and corp level. The qualitative deficit was at the Army level. Meade was competent if not brilliant and he turned a good army into the lean mean figthting machine which Grant used to such good effect.

You are right in at least one aspect:
Grant did not want to maneuver Lee out of his position....

Grant wanted Lee to stay put and to commense a rear attack againt the rail supplying Lee, thus collapsing the entire confederate defense of the Richmond area. It wasn't until Lee realized he had been out maeuvered that he moved into secondary prepared position with included Petersburg.

Second...to hammer Lee. The ANV reinforced other theaters/AOs on a regular basis (Tenn, Valley, North Carolina, etc). After Cold harbor, Lee had not the assests to take any reinforcing and especially not any offensive actions. He isolated Lee, while conducting the destruction of infrastructure supporting the warmaking of the confederacy, not just Lee, although there were political effects of doing so.

If I remember correctly, Grant explains in his memoirs and provides the orders issued to subordinates on the concept of operations in N. Va..stating he did not want to maneuver Lee to the south and onto Butler (in more or less words here). He wanted Lee's full attention to his front to make that rear attack.

For the Johnston - Sherman relationship, well I guess the confederacy politics did not like the slow stangulation of the region. If I remember correctly, Johnston was continously out maneuvered by Sherman and the Confederate presidnet wanted action. I doubt that Johnston could have done much because the powers above him dictated his operation and made the big, yet common, historical mistake of making terrain the objective of an army instead of the combat capability of the opponent. Even if Johnston was still in command...he would have defended a feature and Sherman would have gone around him. This would have been much better stategy for the Union cause, for eventually, Johnston would have had to defend the Atlanta terrain feature. Thus allowing Sherman to "bottle up" the effective confederate combat power still left in the deep south. Result is the same as the end was with Hood, but probally quicker as once contained the conferates loose any threat of active combat action.

We can do alot of what if this or that...but if we look at the operations from a common military sense view, I think one can only conclude that Grant was the far more caable general. What Grant had the Lee never did was a strategic view of the war and the operation capability to carry that view out. In offensive operations Grant never lost focus of the strategic outcome of local operations. In offensive operations where Lee carried the ANV into the north, what we his stragetic goals? The were just plain fantasy...maybe the folks will revolt in Philadelphia, etc...his only "realistic" goal was to relieve Va of the logistics burden. No where did he have, at least I can't find it, a stategic concept or goal to effectively reduce/diminish the combat capability of his opponents...he actually enhanced that ability by his movement into and concentration in Pa.

Gota go...lunch time is over!

quote:

Originally posted by scutarii:
Grant by far.

No other general sucessfully commanded the at the level and scope which he did. From the Unit-to Corps-to Army-to Theater-to National Level, no one did this except he.

Grant had only marginal supervision of the conduct of the war in the west. Remember, not only did he have to keep watch of the Army of the Potomac, He had the Army of the Shenandoah, the Army of the Ohio, and a couple of other lesser armies to supervise, hard to do over such distances although railroad transportation eases those burdens. The hard part about that though was the poor condition of southern railroads. He basically handed control of the western theater to Sherman only requiring that Sherman report to Grant his plans of action and submit them for Grant's approval. Grant shadowed the Army of the Potomac...looming large over one of the more controversial, and often forgotten generals of the Civil War, George Gordon Meade.

In my honest opinion, and remember that's just what it is..

North:

Brevet Lt. Gen Winfield Scott (Anaconda Plan)
Lt Gen. U.S. Grant (Ft Donelson and Vicksburg)
Maj Gen. W. T. Sherman (Atlanta)
Maj Gen. G. H. Thomas
Maj Gen. George Meade
Maj Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock
Maj Gen. Phil Sheridan

Confederate:

Gen R. E. Lee
Lt Gen Longstreet
Lt Gen "Stonewall" Jackson
Lt Gen Nathan Bedford Forrest
Lt Gen A. P. Hill
Gen Joseph Johnston
Gen Albert Sidney Johnston

It is hard to say, because while some generals were better tacticians, other were better strategist, adminstrators etc. Robert E. Lee and Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson were arguably the best tacticians, Ulysses S. Grant and William Tecumseh Sherman the best
strategists. George McClellan was probably the best adminstrator. What real make a great general is one that excels in all three categories.

Battle Planner in my Opinion would be PTG Beuregard

Best at doing whatever it taked W.T Sherman (although as a southerner I hate to admit it)

Best to have at your side in a fight Nathan Bedford Forrest beyond a shadow of doubt.

Once we get the sectional nonsense out of the way, the comments became very interesting.

The best: Strategic -- Grant; Operational -- Grant and Lee; Tactical -- Lee.

However, only one General drove an opposing Army in a campaign and destroyed it, and he did it twice: Grant at Vicksburg and Appomattox.

This is like chess;

I'd give Grant 300 men and Lee 50 men of his choosing. It would probably take the remaining 45 soldiers Lee had left maybe 6 or 8 hours to bury the fallen Veterans of Grant.

My thoughts anyway.

Travis

quote:

Originally posted by travisab1:
This is like chess;

I'd give Grant 300 men and Lee 50 men of his choosing. It would probably take the remaining 45 soldiers Lee had left maybe 6 or 8 hours to bury the fallen Veterans of Grant.

My thoughts anyway.

Travis

Lee is the most overrated general in American history. Lee consistantly wasted men like water. He had fewer men and lost a far higher percentage of them than Grant did.

He totally screwed up the Cheat Mountain campaign in Western Virginia early in the war.

After throwing men away all day on uncoordinated assualts at Gaines' Mill he finally won, but only due to the apperance of an unexpected gap that appeared in the Union line at sunset.

At Malvern Hill he communicated so badly with his subordinates that once again the attacks were uncoordinated and resulted in a complete and utter failure.

He managed to hang on at Antietam and was only spared defeat by a lucky turn of the cards when Hill's troops came up at the end of the day.

He did nothing at Fredericksburg to win other than allowing Burnside to lose. His greatest moment at that battle was to simply wax poetic: "It is well that war is so horrible otherwise we would grow to fond of it." Wow. Such a philospher.

Chancellorsville is called his "greatest victory" but he didn't win that battle as much as Hooker lost it and, as usual Lee threw away so many troops that it was merely a pyrrhic victory.

And then there's Gettysburg. Lee was just a tired old man at that battle, suffering from heart disease and diarrhea. Had he any brains he would have turned over command to Longstreet who was in better health and a staunch realist, but Lee was too selfish and pigheaded to do that. He really beleived his troops could break through an impregnable postion without supports waiting in reserve. What a moron.

The rest of the war for Lee was nothing more than a fait accompli; bidding time until he completely managed to drive his army to wreck and ruin long after the handwritting was on the wall. What a loser.

This message has been edited. Last edited by: Sackcoat_and_Ashes,

quote:

Originally posted by travisab1:
This is like chess;

I'd give Grant 300 men and Lee 50 men of his choosing. It would probably take the remaining 45 soldiers Lee had left maybe 6 or 8 hours to bury the fallen Veterans of Grant.

Wrong. Lee and his 45 dimwits would have done what they did at Appomattox. Surrender.

Lee was just a dorky old fart. He could have used Depends at Gettysburg.



Marse Robert sez, "Pull my finger."

quote:

Lee is the most overrated general in American history. Lee consistantly wasted men like water. He had fewer men and lost a far higher percentage of them than Grant did.

He totally screwed up the Cheat Mountain campaign in Western Virginia early in the war.

Sackcoat;

You're probably right about Cheat Mountain but as far as wasting men like water...How many Union soldiers died during that war and how many Confederate soldiers died during that same war???

Now, tell me who wasted men like water. As I remember reading somewhere Lee surrendered the state of Virginia to Grant not the whole of the South. When the South heard what he did they just figured the war was over for all.

Travis

Wellll, I figure most of you Northerners are a bit put out with me soooo, I thought I'd post this E-Mail I received from a fellow Southerner...
A very genteel Southern lady was driving across the Savannah River
Bridge in Georgia one day. As she neared the top of the bridge,
she noticed a young man fixen {ready} to jump.
She stopped her car, rolled down the window and said, "Please
don't jump, think of your dear mother and father."
He replied, "Mom and Dad are both dead; I'm going to jump."
She said, "Well, think of your wife and children."
He replied, "I'm not married and I don't have any kids."
She said, "Well, think of Robert E. Lee."
He replied, 'Who's Robert E. Lee?'
She replied, 'Well bless your heart, just go ahead and jump, you
dumb *** Yankee."
Remember that in the south, you can say anything to anyone as long as you say, "Bless your heart".

You gotta love it,

Travis

James McPherson has just brought out a new book, which of course I cannot recall the title of - as the Alzheimer's gets momentum.
In it, he very carefully shows that overall, from the beginning to the end of the war, Grant's loses were smaller than Lee's. Lee's weakness for frontal assaults was very wasteful in terms of casualties.

What no one seems to comprehend is my point that the South never had any realistic chance of succeeding. Remove RE Lee from the equation and the war is over in 1862. In poker terms he did this by successful application of bluff. By acting as if he had 100,000 men to spare he conviced the North and its commanders that he did in fact have 100,000 men at his disposal. Every time Lee divided his force to conduct a flank attack he left himself vulnerable to a simple straightforward frontal attack.

Every opponent Lee had had the option of pinning Lee to a spcific position and using the remainder of his forces to conduct a rear or flank attack, especially as Lee was absolutley commited to the defehse of Richmond. None of his opponents ever had any difficulty in bringing him to battle although many might have wished they did. And lest you denigrate Lee for defending Richmond, had he expressed the slightest hint of abandoning the capitol to conduct a mobile defense, he would have been instantly relieved of command by Davis.

When Lee wants to invade the North he does so at will. When his opponent wants to invade the South there is Lee directly in his front. I do not agree with the concept that Lee's two invasions were reckless. Sans the "lost order" the first invasion is a brilliant success. I still maintain that given that the South is doomed to lose accepting battle against the specific opponent of McClelland is a justifiable risk and an almost successful one at that. Had Lee gained victory and he almost did, foreign recognition and intervention would almost cerainly occurred.

The second invasion culminating at Gettysburg could also have culminated insuccess. As it was it was a closely won "victory" by the North. Even a small "victory" leading to a withdrawal and defense at the Pipe Creek line by Meade could have swayed the Northern electorate to repalace Lincoln with McClelland--a true disaster.

Consider Garnt in the West. He never fought an opponent without overwhelming superiority. Even at Shiloh he knew that reardless of the outcome of the first days battle, within 24 hrs he would double his force.

Look at his opponents. Pillow and Floyd--cowards. Bragg--so incompetent that his men would rather lose to the enemy than to win for him. The "Bishop" and Pemberton. Albert Sidney, the best of the lot never had the chance to grow into the position. In every case he had the advantage of opponents who were pinned to a position, Corinth, Vicksburg, Donaldson and Henry, Lookout Mt. Even Shiloh was an extended defense of Corinth.

Please do not bragg about Sherman's expertise. Had he continued to face Johston the war might still be going on. Sherman only did what any of Lee's opponent's could have done, he maneuvered. Had Johnston remained in command he would have relinquished Atlanta. But he would have prevented Sherman from initiating his march to the Sea. And if he was foolhardy enough to try anyway, Johnston wuld have annhiliated him. Even unopposed Sherman almost did not make the sea. I would have loved to see a battle of Peachtree Creek with Johnston conducting the fighting. Sherman could easily hve lost a third of his army in one battle. And Johnston would have never, never, never have squandered his army like Hood di.

But most telling reverse their postions. What would Lee have done with 100,000 against 40,000. What would Grant have done with the reverse.

Wow. A debate between Grant and Lee. How copasetic. Out of all these posts, I find only one mentioning of George H. Thomas (think Mills Creek and Franklin), let alone Joe Johnston, only several mentionings of Sherman, none of Phillip Sheridan (think Stones River), no mentioning of McClellan (except for bashing) and his excellent defensive skills, organizational skills, and some offensive skills (do YOU know what happened in West Virginia in 1861?), or P.G.T. Beauregaurd in the beginning of the war. No talk of Greene at Gettysburg, or Patrick Cleburne in almost every battle he fought in. Or how about Leonidas Polk? While Robert E. Lee and Grant were capable and skilled generals, I don't even need to argue that the above listed men are of equal skill. There's too many generals in the Civil War to argue who was the best. If Albert Sydney Johnson hadn't been killed at the Battle of Shiloh would the war have been different. Darn right. He was the second highest-ranking Confederate general at the time, and Lee was a subordinate officer to him before the war. He was just so good that instead of sitting in the back like most high-ranking generals, he was in the thick of the fight. The list can go on and on. Too many good generals, and too many awful ones, and most ranging in between.
"Please do not bragg about Sherman's expertise."
expertise does not qualify only to the battlefield. I would argue that total war, secret war, and internal war are far better tactics than meeting one's enemy in pitched battle. Not many other generals implemented alternative tactics like they should have, so he is still one of the best, along with hundreds of others.