Was he right? It's nearly four years since this piece was written. More to follow. Has your opinion changed over the past years of his writings?
About the Author

Columnist and former soldier David H. Hackworth is the author of The Price of Honor, and contributed weekly commentary to DefenseWatch. For more information, visit Colonel Hackworth's homepage or the DefenseWatch Website.

Have an opinion about this column? Sound off in the Hackworth Discussion Board.

February 6, 2002

Sadly, most World War II vets, whose sacrifices brought us V-E (Victory in Europe) and V-J (Victory over Japan) Day, will hear taps long before we celebrate V-T Day (Victory over Terrorism). And the rest of our citizens will feel the pain of this terrible war for decades. Not only from more deaths and further disruption of the good life, but from the financial burden that will rob medical and social programs and tear up family savings.

"In all history, there is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare," wrote Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu more than 2,500 years ago. "Only one who knows the disastrous effects of a long war can realize the supreme importance of rapidity in bringing it to a close. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war who can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on."

For sure, this war will not be Desert Storm short. Long before Israel became a state in 1948, its people were fighting terrorists just as they are still doing today -- with an end to the bloodshed nowhere in sight.

But President Bush and his Pentagon wranglers deserve high marks for the well-aimed first shots fired and for gearing up to go the distance in this worldwide unconditional war against terrorism - that like cancer must be cut out wherever it festers -- beginning with the countries they've retagged as this century's "Axis of Evil:" Iran, Iraq and North Korea. These repressive states have dealt in violence against free, civilized peoples for decades and should be taken out with the same speed and purpose as was employed against the last century's evil Axis -- Germany, Japan and Italy.

Members of the Bush team must not only fight smart but stay as sharply focused on containing the costs of this conflict as they are on finding and fighting the enemy. If they think the war's given them license to raid the public purse, they should revisit the Vietnam War and think again.

Bush is seeking almost $400 billion for the Pentagon for next year and plans to increase the annual defense budget to about $440 billion by 2007 -- more for guns and gunpowder than the rest of the world combined will be spending over the same period. Sure, our fighting machine has atrophied during the past decade and needs money in a bad way to take care of the troops, replace worn-out gear and transform the military into a leaner, meaner fighting machine with more unpiloted aircraft and ever-more-modern weapons.

But we can't break Bank USA by using million-dollar weapons to kill $5,000 targets, as was done in Afghanistan. Nor can we allow the Pentagon to spend big on Cold War stuff -- designed to take down the Soviet Union, which crashed a decade ago -- like the half-billion-dollar heavy Crusader artillery system, the billion-dollar new reconnaissance helicopter, or the $5 billion budgeted to buy F-22 Stealth fighters.

We don't need 800-ton gorillas to take out 30-pound rats.

Most of the congressional porkers are afraid to stand tall and stop this the-enemy-is-at-the-gates spending spree. They don't want to come off as opposing a military buildup when their fickle constituency has war fever. And besides, there's the dough that'll be pumped into their states - not to mention their re-election coffers - for all this so-called "urgent anti-terrorist war gear."

We've got to start putting our money in the right places, not the right pockets. Like making our cities and our ports of entry -- air, sea and ground -- terrorist-proof instead of wasting another $60 billion on Star Wars II.

Why shouldn't our ports be at least half as tight as the Super Bowl?

And why aren't the Marines, Special Operations, Coast Guard, FBI and Border Patrol more sensible investments than most of those gold-plated toys at the top of the Pentagon's shopping list?

"In war, then, let your object be victory, not lengthy campaigns," Sun Tzu wrote. "(T)he leader of armies is the arbiter of the people's fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or peril."

Our leader is George Bush. Let's hope he's read Sun Tzu, or at least listened to the LBJ tapes.

© 2002 David H. Hackworth. All opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of Military.com.

This message has been edited. Last edited by: DaveBarker,

HE COULDN'T HAVE BEEN MORE RIGHT...WE NEED TO BEEF UP OUR BORDER PROTECTION AND FIND MORE GROUND TROOPS TO WIN THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISTS.

STOP SENDING SMART BOMBS AFTER DUMB RAGHEADS...

WE MISS YA, COLONEL

Here is one by the Colonel which caused some heavy discussion!
September 4, 2002

Fifty-two years ago, on a cold day on the Korean front, my lieutenant gave me a copy of Chinese Gen. Sun Tsu’s classic The Art of War. I've been a disciple ever since; the book has become my military bible, and I read a passage daily.

Sun Tzu lays it all out: Know your enemy; the art of war cannot be neglected; all warfare is based on deception; the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plans; make sure the enemy threat is real.

Wise thinking about war and peace that Bush 43 should borrow from to help him counter the counsel of his advisers baying for Saddam's head. And since nobody has yet come up with sufficient justification for our grunts laying their lives on the line, the war gang would do well to slow down and study this brilliant Chinese general's words as well.

By the way, none of these hawks – not one of whom ever wore a soldier suit, even though most were of draft age back during the dark days of Vietnam – or their sons or daughters will be accompanying our warriors on their march to Baghdad. As usual, it will be a war fought by mainly blue-collar Americans with no vested interests in the oil business.

Back in 1991, when Stormin' Norman had the Iraqi army on the ropes, Super-Hawk Dick Cheney knew that Saddam had WMD (weapons of mass destruction) – but he still went along with Bush 41's decision to let the perps walk. Cheney should have stood in the door when 41 made that bad call and insisted we take out Saddam while we had the world behind us, and the forces on the ground to do the job. Or he should have resigned.

Yet 11 years later, Cheney is the main cheerleader for attacking Iraq because – breaking news – Saddam has chemical and bio weapons. And, he keeps telling us, Saddam now also has nukes.

Even though many experts say it isn't so, let's buy into Cheney's pitch and agree that Iraq has a few small nuclear warheads. The question then becomes: “Can he land them in New York City or Los Angeles?” The answer is: “No.”

Saddam just doesn't have the fleets of ICBMs that we and 43's new best friend, Russian President Vladimir Putin, do. All he can muster at most are a few-dozen wheezing Scud missiles, onto which he could try to screw his alleged nuke warheads. On a good day, these throwbacks to the Vietnam era would have a range of 100 miles and be about as accurate as a blind man firing a shotgun at the sound of a bat in a forest.

During the 50-year Cold War – the good old days through post-9/11 eyes – the Soviets had approximately 50,000 nukes. About half were capable of zipping across our oceans and turning our country into a radiated inferno. But we never took the Sovs out, even when their leader hammered his shoe and warned the United Nations that he was going to bury us. Even when we knew Soviet soldiers had one hand on the nuclear button while the other was holding the bottles of vodka they were slugging down.

The hairiest time during the Cold War was when the Soviets deployed nuclear missiles to Cuba. The 90 miles from launch to target brought us to the brink, because we'd have all been glowing before our missiles could have struck back. Jack Kennedy demanded the Soviets get ‘em out, or U.S. Marines and paratroopers would. But first he got on the tube and told us the way it was: That we had documented U-2 shots of Soviet missiles, soldiers and launchers in Cuba. That we had no choice – we had to take them out, and the risk was worth the gain. Because he made his case, the American people said, “Do it, Jack.”

Our president must bring us equally convincing reasons for going to war with Iraq. And it's going to be a stretch for 43 to prove that Iraq's WMD are a clear and present danger to our country when they're apparently not threatening the Middle Eastern states within their range, states whose leaders have so loudly said, “USA, don't use the military solution.”


© 2002 David H. Hackworth. All opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of Military.com.

This old war-horse, savvy prophet wrote these words in 2002. I'm confident he knew 43 didn't have the charisma to make a strong case and he's proving he still doesn't. I doubt he could pronounce General Sun Tsu, let alone read any of his works. A certain caliber of merit is required to read and understand the great war strategists. Our current planners need to get back on track or they have little chance of subduing the terrorist network. The revitalization of this group in the mountains of Afghanistan and Pakistan are proof they're going to see if they can bleed us and outlast us.

I have some veterans coming in to see me, who served in Afghanistan. BTW we still have a conflict going on there. Please do not forget the troops!

Colonel Hackworth: Putting Black Hawk Down In
Proper Context

History Directory: Somalia - Find an overview and links to resources on this conflict.

Memorial For Sgt. 1st Class Randall D. Shughart - Tribute honors the Army Ranger who died defending the Black Hawk crew.

February 13, 2002

The five-star movie "Black Hawk Down" smacks you right between the eyes with the sheer brutality of infantry combat, however magnificently portrayed by film maestro Ridley Scott. But while it showcases the professionalism and bravery of our U.S. Army Special Operations warriors in Mogadishu, it's far too light on the lessons to be learned from that terrible disaster.

In December 1992, I went to Somalia. On a much smaller scale, the conditions were like those in Vietnam: snipers, mines and booby traps were killing and wounding our soldiers, and we had a hard time finding the guerrilla enemy -- who fought only on their terms.

This time, I was looking at the battlefield as a war correspondent, but there was no way to take the young soldier out of the old reporter. My style was to hang out with one of the rifle platoons for five days and then send in my copy. Pretty soon, eating and sleeping with the grunts, I became just a guy who'd been around a war or two. It wasn't long before, "Hey, Hack, does this machine gun have a good field of fire?" and, "What do you think of this patrol formation?"

I was tagging along with Maj. Martin Stanton of the 2/87th Infantry, an old pal, when he asked me to give a class on how we used choppers in Vietnam. "Are you sure?" I asked. "Remember, I'm bad news as far as the Army's concerned. What's the Pentagon going to say when they hear you've got me teaching a class?"

Stanton was sure. I gave a two-hour lecture on airmobile operations in a guerrilla environment. "This is how we did it in Vietnam," I told them.

Most looked at me with blank faces as if I were talking "Star Wars" to the moon. I realized with an electric shock that these fine young 10th Division soldiers were like explorers in an unknown land without a map or compass, and one single cram session on airmobile missions wasn't going to be much help. All of the lessons paid for so dearly from Vietnam had disappeared.

After I left Somalia, a Ranger Task Force, some of the best warriors going, deployed to Mogadishu. They conducted six chopper operations, all using identical tactics and techniques, during which they dropped into the objective, conducted a raid and returned to base. On their seventh raid, they were tasked to capture Mohammed Aidid, a clan guerrilla leader. But because their leaders hadn't factored into the equation that Aidid's boys were watching -- the way smart terrorists do -- they ended up surrounded, trapped and, except for their courage and fighting skill, would have been destroyed to the man.

Besides employing a bush-league tactical plan, the general in charge, William Garrison, had no contingency plan to bail out his boys if the op turned bad. No USAF tactical air support. No tanks ready to break through to the besieged Rangers -- even though Marine tanks were close, the Army didn't want the Marines to ride to the rescue because of inter-service rivalry. And so our warriors were severely bloodied - 18 died, and more than 100 were wounded, a rout that caused the sole surviving superpower to beat feet out of Somalia, dragging its tail.

For personal and professional reasons, I went to Walter Reed Hospital in Washington, D.C., to talk to the wounded, then to Fort Benning, Ga., to meet with some of the Rangers who'd been in the fight. They told me officially and again unofficially at night over beers how they'd been sucked in and then out-guerrillaed, outmaneuvered, outsmarted. A detailed assessment of the debacle is in my book, Hazardous Duty.

As today's top military leaders go up the chain, like most executives in large organizations, they develop a disease called CRN -- Can't Remember Nothing -- and forget what it's like to be at the bottom. Somewhere along the line, they stop listening to the grunts who do the fighting and dying, the ones who know what they need to defeat our enemies and survive.

We must protect the troops in Afghanistan by applying what we learned the hard way in Somalia, starting with sending some tanks into Kandahar ASAP.

© 2002 David H. Hackworth. All opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of Military.com.

Dave and other 'strong willed members' of Hack's Forum....given this alota' thought. I'll be straight out, I'm gonna come to discuss some of the late Colonel's articles.

The article where Soldier's of 10th Mtn(L) are being discussed, 2002, and tactics of deployment with rotary wing equipment, will be one. The offical/non-offical of conversations of our elite 75th Regt may come to play as well. Because they both connect, yet, there is some preceived contrast with both, according to our late Colonel, and some of which I'd like to add and that may make his articles complete.

As much of what will be contained in these posts will be factual,as it should be, to allow little or no room for preception and individual unfounded theories. 'Cause after all the Colonel and his team had put sincere energy to develop the results that he and others like him have written. But there is some questions for me in a portion of his late writtings.

This message has been edited. Last edited by: daCAT,

The Light Infantry Division.

During the Army's transformation in the mid 70s we were coming to be. Emerging from the famine of $$$ in the Carter Adminstration the Army's gee whiz equipment was coming to be. A brigade of 101st commanded by the 'All American' COL Pete Dawkins had been testing the blackhawk. Tactics the Colonel described from VietNam were employed with this rotary wing aircraft against a brigade of the 5th(M) Infantary Division. 101st supported by an elite battalion of 82d and a team of SF were defeated within 24 hours. Excersise was replayed two more times, with the OPFOR (101st) spotted an additional infantry battalion of armor and infantry. Again, success for the seasoned warriors of 2d Bde 5th Infantry Division. Why? The tactics employed in SE Asia and most veterans of the 11th ACR indicated that superior training and realistic training(NTC/7ATC) had preveailed. This was 1979!

As the Light Infantry Divison became a realistic necessity, prioirty of assignment was given to the 6th, 7th, 10, and 25th. It was determined the need for all Soldiers to be trained and utilized as Combat Soldiers. Qualifcations of those in Leadership; AirAssault(after all their mission), Ranger Tab, and Pathfinder.

Ranger program had gotten a boost at the same time in recruitment and assecsion. The lethal punch was to deploy a LID to a hot spot in support of or supported by SOCOM elements (at the time evolving to its own command).

Heavy divisions would follow, after all it was still the Cold War, but the training and doctrine had not overlooked what we are now engaged in, that was '83. (Deployments and training supports this statement.) Now the Blackhawk had come into its own, AASSLT was being conducted, the 160th could deploy transport and extract Soldier's at any given location and time under the worst conditions, this was '86.

Success with the press in and outa' Panama, thank you 75th! The press thought it'd bring to us an invassion, shame on us, but then again the 100 hour CNN War . Back in time to January 1990, we were in & out mission accomplsihed, back to training!

So up to this point LL had been applied, LTs from RVN that had been trained by battaion commanders, now GOs, we were at the threshold of being the best trained, best equipped, and best led military. Any argument?

This is where I come to a juncture with our Colonel's writtings. He pauses to discuss his experience of a battalion of Infantry Soldiers, and the assistance asked by a field grade office to introduce Hack's philosphy of being airmobile. Conclusion: the officer charged with the responsibility of training and the lives and welfare of his Soldier's was the one clueless, not the Army, its doctrine and implementation of both that and training.

This message has been edited. Last edited by: daCAT,

quote:

daCat: "But there is some questions for me in a portion of his late writtings."

I think that goes for many of us. Some believe his last series was other than his own writings or his own thoughts.

quote:

Was he right? It's nearly four years since this piece was written. More to follow. Has your opinion changed over the past years of his writings?

Pretty much so and on target regarding the equipment, but not the $$$.!

quote:

But we can't break Bank USA by using million-dollar weapons to kill $5,000 targets, as was done in Afghanistan. Nor can we allow the Pentagon to spend big on Cold War stuff -- designed to take down the Soviet Union, which crashed a decade ago -- like the half-billion-dollar heavy Crusader artillery system, the billion-dollar new reconnaissance helicopter, or the $5 billion budgeted to buy F-22 Stealth fighters.

Fortunately most of those gee whiz projects destined for equipment has been shelved. However, the F22 did get a shot in the arm with an additional amount equal to half of the orginal budgeted mentioned amount in Hack's column. Not much of a savings.

quote:

Originally posted by daCAT:

Pretty much so and on target regarding the equipment, but not the $$$.!

quote:

But we can't break Bank USA by using million-dollar weapons to kill $5,000 targets, as was done in Afghanistan. Nor can we allow the Pentagon to spend big on Cold War stuff -- designed to take down the Soviet Union, which crashed a decade ago -- like the half-billion-dollar heavy Crusader artillery system, the billion-dollar new reconnaissance helicopter, or the $5 billion budgeted to buy F-22 Stealth fighters.

Fortunately most of those gee whiz projects destined for equipment has been shelved. However, the F22 did get a shot in the arm with an additional amount equal to half of the orginal budgeted mentioned amount in Hack's column. Not much of a savings.

It appears to me, when Hack was writing his articles, he stepped out where all others feared to tread. His predictions were almost uncanny. Money wise he may be off at this point. However the fat lady ain't sang yet!

Just a shot at the 'powers' relating to the $$$ , Some bizzare and scary method they believe they're gettin' a bargin. Somehow I'd think those monies destined for the rotary wing and artillery coulda' been destined for more essential equipment that would best serve, our Soldiers. After all the money was allocatted for the Army from the approiate FY Defense Bill. Where does the $$$ earmarked for R&D go when an item(s) has been terminated? I know we get the residuals back. The Crusader is sitting on a piece of asphalt behind the Ft Sill Museum along with a massive amounts of Artillery items from the Civil War to present, to include a large portion of captured equipment from Desert Storm.

The Crusader is a huge and impressive item and appreciate it being cancelled. Though the lack of appreciation I received from my less than reserved view on it being 20 years too late, and not being the right fit for today's Army continues today with cold stares and possibly thoughts I'd best not venture to know.

The monies expended for the antciapted fielding of this item, or any other go way beyond those allocatted through the Defense Bill Authorization. Money is gained and spent for the property where the antcipated item is to be built, good for the local seller, bad investment for the corporation (UT). Local (city/county/state) funds were diverted for infactructure necessary to prepare the property. After all it woulda' been a prize to manufacture an item for the 'Queen of Battle' 10 miles from the property line of the Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill. The other residual fall out from the cancelling of the Crusader were IMHO the end of two in the Army Leadership, and an upstanding Congressman. Just a tad of FYI and two cents of what can be involved in 'pork' and what was.

His article is on target.

Does this article remind us of anything?
Colonel Hackworth: Wanted - A Committee For
Protection Of Grunts

January 16, 2002

When the Afghan campaign was red-hot and bombs and missiles were exploding with deadly precision in every direction, all that gee-whiz smart weaponry the military-industrial-congressional complex has been pushing since the Vietnam War was front and center on the tube.

We saw $2 billion B-2 state-of-the-art long-range bombers stay in the air longer than an Irish wake, and saw unmanned aircraft armed with missiles bring death and destruction with the push of a long-distance button to targets as small as individual enemy soldiers on donkeys. Push another button and presto -- there was Gen. Tommy Franks from his Florida command center, courtesy of video conferencing.

No question that smart weapons and systems help win battles. But a critical component of war is still the grunt -- and his place in the metaphorical mud seriously sucks. Bush and boys need to begin with the basics and start doing better for our guys out there on the line.

Take the glimpses we caught of our Marines and Army soldiers digging foxholes in Afghanistan. Their entrenching tools were basically the same as that sorry shovel -- about the size of a child's beach toy -- the grunts used at Normandy and Iwo Jima and in Korea, Vietnam and Iraq.

Having dug more than a few foxholes, I know firsthand the pain and exhaustion of digging in. Which brings to mind a 1932 Fordson tractor I once owned -- and treasured -- that dug 10 good holes in an hour with its auger. One auger-outfitted Hummer vehicle could dig in a rifle platoon in an hour.

Then there's the CH-46 helicopter, a 40-year-old dinosaur held together by green duct tape, wire and Marine dedication. Not exactly the right stuff for the extreme dust and danger of Afghanistan. Why the Marines don't ground this accident-waiting-to-happen and borrow Blackhawks from non-deployed Army units is another one for the SecDef's list.

The grunt's M-16A2 rifle has also been around since Vietnam, where our troops uniformly damned it. Updated, with most of the bugs ironed out, this 5.56-mm. fly swatter still rates only average in reliability, functioning and grunt confidence. Given a choice, most Special Forces soldiers would go with the upgraded World War II Soviet AK-47. A top SF warrior with whom I shared a foxhole in Desert Storm says, "We have no doubt that come hell or high water, the AK won't let us down." The standard issue Beretta pistol is worse than a Saturday night special, while the "new" machine gun -- not much of an improvement on the World War I model that I had in my weapons squad in Korea! -- has been in use since 1962.

The Marines have just issued a boot that every leatherneck I've talked to loves, but soldiers call the Army's "lousy." They say it's "too heavy," "soaks up water and takes hours to dry" and has "insoles made of flimsy pieces of material" that most grunts throw away and replace with a self-purchased civilian product. And the "soles chip, clog with mud, wear out quickly and don't absorb much shock," making them bad news during long hikes. No, these beauts aren't made by our enemies, but by Altama Footwear, which has got such a sweet deal with the brass that it's OK for soldiers to display the name tags as if they were Tommy H. The Army, which just spent $35 million on the equally hated black beret, claims it wants to replace this circa 1969 boot, but there's no dough.

The generals and congressional porkers prefer gold-plated stuff like the B-2 -- which flew only six missions over Afghanistan because it's not waterproof and needs more maintenance than Joan Collins -- to foxhole diggers, rifles, pistol, machine guns and boots. Smart weapons and smarter systems always get priority because porker power bucks are always part of the package. Grunt gear throws off only chump change.

The Senate has three surviving combat grunts -- Max Cleland of Georgia, Chuck Hagel of Nebraska and Conrad Burns of Montana. As a legacy, they should form a Committee for the Protection of the Grunts to make sure the folks who pay the high price on our behalf finally get better weapons and tools. There are committees for everything else: birds, trees, whales. Certainly, our Grunts -- and we've been burying a lot of these brave warriors lately -- are our most precious endangered species. Let's start treating them as such.

© 2002 David H. Hackworth. All opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of Military.com.

HACK WAS RIGHT...EXPENSIVE WEAPONS WIN "BATTLES" BUT GRUNTS WIN "WARS".

I AM REMINDED WHY I LEFT AD SERVICE. I WAS ASSIGNED TO A COMMAND AND WEAPONS SYSTEM THAT WAS FULLY CAPABLE OF ENDING THE WAR I HAD VOLUNTEERED FOR IN A MATTER OF WEEKS...YET I WAS TOLD BY A PASSED-OVER BIRD COLONEL IN MY HDQTRS RECORD REVIEW THAT I WOULD BE FLYING BUFFS FOR ANOTHER 3 YEARS... THIS DISCUSSION TOOK PLACE IN DECEMBER 1969!!

WE NEED THE WILL TO USE MASSIVE FORCE OR WE MUST PUT A MASSIVE FORCE ON THE GROUND...OTHERWISE WE WILL CONTINUE A LONG WAR OF WINNING THE BATTLES AND THAT PROSPECT IS SICKENING TO ME.

BATTLES COST GRUNTS THEIR LIVES!

BUMP FOR DAVE

quote:

they should form a Committee for the Protection of the Grunts to make sure the folks who pay the high price on our behalf finally get better weapons and tools.

Each Service gets their shot to the approriate bodies and their committees (HAsC SAsC). Yet, how does that all get to where it needs too? First, to the non intrested parties, our elected, selctive representatives. Where are their intrest for what is best (?), how many gezzillion letters from concerned constiguents(?), and those bondoggles excuse me... those trips to visit our Soldiers throughout the world? Take a swag, could the subject of the basic issue and LBE surfaced enough over the past 30 years, five or twenty times? It has not been a deep secret regarding those basic needs for our Soldiers to be in
step the indentification of those items procurred through those such as the united or general corporations.!?

Hack was right on target regarding his articles associated with various basic issue body, light vehicle, etc. hooah!

Now, the other side of the fence that is of concern whethere it be blue, green or purple suitor.? The strentgh of the qual, qar, or simpley demand; , acquistion/procurment are the end result with the Army Leadership.....maybe.

Look how long its to taken' to issue the grunt the right boot!? HB^6

quote:

Marines have just issued a boot that every leatherneck I've talked to loves, but soldiers call the Army's "lousy." They say it's "too heavy," "soaks up water and takes hours to dry" and has "insoles made of flimsy pieces of material" that most grunts throw away and replace with a self-purchased civilian product. And the "soles chip, clog with mud, wear out quickly and don't absorb much shock,"

....oh, so its ok that the troops do with what they got....?!!!!

but let us not forget the fleet!.....!!!!!

quote:

Then there's the CH-46 helicopter, a 40-year-old dinosaur held together by green duct tape, wire and Marine dedication. Not exactly the right stuff for the extreme dust and danger of Afghanistan. Why the Marines don't ground this accident-waiting-to-happen and borrow Blackhawks from non-deployed Army units is another one for the SecDef's list.

Does anyone know how many helicpter crashes Marines have had since the article was written and what type of helicopters involved?

quote:

quote:
Then there's the CH-46 helicopter, a 40-year-old dinosaur held together by green duct tape, wire and Marine dedication. Not exactly the right stuff for the extreme dust and danger of Afghanistan. Why the Marines don't ground this accident-waiting-to-happen and borrow Blackhawks from non-deployed Army units is another one for the SecDef's list.

Does anyone know how many helicpter crashes Marines have had since the article was written and what type of helicopters involved?

Believe there have been two fatal accidents of their workhorse in March & April of 2003, both in deployment in OIF. prior there had been 3 going back to '96. Five in 10 years.

Problem is that the Corps wants a specific R/W aircraft to meet the requirements for their misson. Other R/W aircraft currently in the DoD inventory do not meet these needs, at least for the past 20 plus years. UH60 not capable of troop and equipment load(artillery), and well the V22 has gone the long road and may never get fully funded for fielding. This being the Corp's choice of equipment.

Hack's illustration of being held together by duct tape may be an exageration. The aircraft requires @ 13 hours of maintenance for 1 hour of fight time. And the cost of refurbishment of parts may be extreme when compared to other maintenance replacement for current R/W inventory.

IMHO the Leadership of the Marine Corps deem this item, currently and prior, as being the right tool. Has the Colonel's opinion been driven by then SecDef in '99 to scrap the Osprey project, for his opinion 3 years latter?, compunded with the tragic loss in two training accidents over the same time frame?

quote:

Hack's illustration of being held together by duct tape may be an exageration.

It may have been somewhat accurate in principle.

March 10, 2004? Now it is 2006.
Let us remember the nasty remarks of those who were telling the Colonel he was wrong. The war would be over quick, so they said!

March 10, 2004 Colonel David Hackworth.

We’re engaged in a terrorist conflict that will no doubt prove to be the longest and nastiest war in our country’s history. Which means we can’t tolerate slack such as: Three National Guard combat brigades being deployed to Iraq that aren’t good-to-go; our deploying warriors still being sent to the killing fields without sufficient armored vests and vehicles; and the outrageously high number of active-duty and reserve-component troops who aren’t deployable but are being paid to soldier anyway.

All of the above – all fixable – can be blamed on bad leadership. There are just too many Perfumed Princes sporting stars who are politicians, lobbyists and salesmen rather than soldiers. Abe Lincoln went through a squad of such spoilers before he found a U.S. Grant. Today, he’d probably have to sort through at least a battalion of the top brass to find one Ulysses.

Another leadership problem – particularly pressing during a war – is the poor quality of the average Army lieutenant (LT). The LT has the most dangerous and demanding leadership job in the Army and is presently the least prepared. That’s because the commissioning sources – West Point, ROTC and Officer Candidate School – have seldom been demanding enough, and that’s especially true today. There’s too much touchy-feely classroom stuff and nowhere near enough practical, down-in-the-dirt training so critical to developing combat leadership skills.

Then, too, most freshly-minted second lieutenants aren’t made of the same true grit as their World War II grandfathers - who had their faces rubbed in the Depression and came from a harsher, far less urbanized, less politically-sensitive place. But even way back then, only about 50 percent of the mass-produced LTs could make it on the battlefield.

By the Korean War, only about four out of 10 "90-day wonders" were up to the job.

And during the Vietnam War, my biggest problem while commanding three infantry battalions, two in combat and one stateside, was – no big surprise – the LTs. Or, as I not-so-fondly called them, the "weakest link." In 1969, while skippering the 4/39th Infantry Battalion, I fired 59 of these losers - which drove our general and Col. Lee Dyment, the guy responsible for LT assignments, absolutely nuts. Not that I cared. No weak-linker was going to kill my guys.

I remember feeling that same determination during the first year of the Korean War when I repeatedly refused a battlefield commission. My top kick finally said: "Hack, if you don’t take the commission, one day some second balloon might come in and take over your platoon. He might also get a lot of people killed. Then how would you feel? You’ve got to take the promotion and look after your troops."




So I did. And during the next 20 years of service, I discovered over and over that the majority of new LTs were seriously lacking. But by the time I was commanding my ninth company-sized unit in Germany in the early ‘60s, I’d developed a magic formula: An eager-beaver LT would report in fresh out of Fort Benning, ready to command the world but incapable of leading a thirsty drunk to happy hour. "LT, meet your platoon sergeant," I’d tell him. "Don’t give any orders or make any decisions without his approval. Walk hand-in-hand with him and learn. He was running a platoon when you were learning how to ride a tricycle, and that's probably where he'll be when you’re a colonel at the Pentagon."

This system worked so well that more than 20 of the hundreds of LTs I trained became general officers. Some commanded divisions and one an Army. None were Perfumed Princes.

Here’s the extrapolation:

Make Basic Officer Entry Training run at least a year. It should be 1960s Ranger-type training designed to forge warrior leaders and weed out the talentless and the weak.

Those who manage to survive should then be assigned to regular platoons as observers under a master sergeant platoon sergeant. As soon as the platoon sergeant recommends a promotion, the new first lieutenant should be given the command of a platoon for a year. And throughout this entire learning-to-lead process, the supervising platoon sergeant would submit evaluations.

A radical departure? Absolutely. But far better than the radical departure of our grunts from Planet Earth.

Please note, the above is not intended to knock today's Guard and Reserves. It is the policy that was taken to task. We still have a war on terror that is expanding, and little is being done to contain it. We have Iran who is a threat to our nation with their nukes in development. We have weak inspections of containers in our ports, those containers are loaded onto trucks and trains and sent throughout the USA. Often with only a bill of laden to indicate what is inside.
We need strong links in command, not weak ones. People need to be extremely well trained, before they take others into deadly combat.