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Military.com Forums Coast Guard Discussions Marine Safety The Future of Marine Safety in the Coast Guard|
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Basic Training |
Read the Commandant's All Hands Message and Vote your opinion.
R 022247Z JUL 07 ZUI ASN-A00183000017 ZYB FM COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC TO ALLHANDS BT UNCLAS //N01000// SUBJ: MULTIPLE BENEFITS OF A MULTIMISSION COAST GUARD TO THE MEN AND WOMEN OF THE COAST GUARD: 1. THIS ALL HANDS IS INTENDED TO PROVIDE EACH OF YOU ACCURATE AND TIMELY INFORMATION REGARDING A FEW RECENT PRESS ARTICLES REPORTING THAT THE COAST GUARD'S LONGSTANDING MARITIME SAFETY MISSION MIGHT BE TRANSFERRED TO ANOTHER AGENCY IN ANOTHER DEPARTMENT. I WANT TO ASSURE YOU OF MY ABSOLUTE COMMITMENT TO EACH OF THE COAST GUARD'S MANDATED MISSIONS, INCLUDING MARITIME SAFETY. 2. LAST WEEK, I SENT A MESSAGE TO SENIOR OPERATIONAL FIELD COMMANDERS OUTLINING MY PRIORITIES AND GUIDANCE FOR EXECUTING OUR VITAL MARITIME SAFETY MISSION. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU READ THIS MESSAGE TO UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF EXECUTING ALL OF OUR MISSIONS, WHILE MAINTAINING A PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH OUR STAKEHOLDERS IN THE MARITIME COMMUNITY. THE MESSAGE HAS BEEN POSTED AND IS AVAILABLE ON THE COMMANDANT'S CORNER OF CG CENTRAL (OUR CG TAB). 3. I AM COMMITTED TO PRESERVING OUR ROLE AS THE WORLD'S LEADER IN MARITIME SAFETY AND AM WORKING WITH THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS TO MAINTAIN AND IMPROVE OUR MARITIME SAFETY AUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES WHERE APPLICABLE. WE ARE ALSO IMPLEMENTING A NUMBER OF INITIATIVES THAT WILL STRENGTHEN OUR PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCIES TO BETTER SERVE THE MARITIME COMMUNITY. AS WE DO THAT, I WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ENSURE THAT NATIONAL LEADERS AND DECISION MAKERS UNDERSTAND THE TREMENDOUS VALUE THE COAST GUARD'S MARITIME SAFETY MISSION BRINGS TO THE SAFETY, SECURITY AND STEWARDSHIP OF OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS. 4. I NEED EACH OF YOU TO REMAIN FOCUSED ON MISSION EXECUTION WHILE PERFORMING YOUR DUTIES. NOTHING SPEAKS LOUDER THAN THE GOOD WORK YOU DO EACH AND EVERY DAY IN SERVICE TO OUR NATION. 5. WE ARE AMERICA'S LIFESAVERS AND GUARDIANS. STAY FOCUSED AND STAY SAFE. 6. INTERNET RELEASE AUTHORIZED. 7. ADM THAD ALLEN SENDS. BT |
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Member |
These hearings may offer some insight...
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Basic Training |
Even more details for those interested...
Summaries of the subject matter pertaining to the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation: http://transportation.house.gov/Media/File/Coast%20Guar...1/SSM_CG_7-31-07.pdf http://transportation.house.gov/Media/File/Coast%20Guar...02/SSM_CG_8-2-07.pdf |
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Basic Training |
As a retired USCG Marine Safety professional (with a fair amount of shore-based "O" background/experience and more than 25 years of Port Ops experience)and now a maritime industry executive, I believe the USCG Marine Safety program is in serious trouble and the subject of congressional hearings for several core reasons. Firstly, the "reorganization" to Sectors and the elements of Prevention, Response, and...whatever...has resulted in widespread confusion both within the USCG organization and outside (particularly within the maritime industry). Frustration is running at an all time high inside and outside the USCG. No one knows who to contact for information or resolution of issues involving the vast field of marine safety. If you are lucky enough to find a person, they typically lack experience or expertise to intelligently discuss marine safety regulations, laws, policy, etc. If one takes a problem "up the chain", you typically find less experience the higher you go. At the Sector Command level, the lack of marine safety experience can frighten a senior officer who worries that a mistake will end their "upward mobility" so industry is often left with no decisions on urgent matters. The marine safety philosophy of equivalency is lost on many senior officers at "sectors". Secondly, the notion that the person designated COTP and OCMI can be any senior USCG officer because their staff will be experienced is unrealistic. It is rare to find an O4 or O5 with marine safety program expertise (Port Ops or Marine Inspection). In my area, it is rare to find an O5 out of their office. Industry interaction is most often with petty officer and J.O.s.
In addition, there seems to be less District staff with "M" experience so industry can't really go "up the chain" for problem resolution. Having "XOs" as marine safety professionals is helpful in the Sector organization but not the solution. The command power must reside with the expert...not the support staff or the "alternate". It takes more than a decade to become proficient (probably 2 decades to be considered expert) in programs (regs, laws, international treaties, policy decisions on equivalency, etc) related to "port operations" or, even more so, marine inspection...not to mention environmental protection/response. The reorganization has resulted in the placement of ship drivers and pilots as Sector Commanders. Mid-grade officers are disgusted and leaving the service. The perception (and likely ultimate reality) is that marine safety professionals have limited upward mobility in terms of rank and (almost more importantly, position...i.e., command). Of course, no J.O. or mid-grade officer would dare tell the emporer that he had no clothes. Solution? Tough as it is, admit the mistake and turn the clock back a little. Keep the Sector Command, if necessary (especially if District M is eliminated..or poorly staffed), but re-establish MSO/Group commands (COTP/OCMI) and make sure the senior person with COTP/OCMI authority is an experienced, professional, marine safety program expert. Re-establish departments of Port Ops, Inspection, Investigation, and licensing so that there is a career path for active duty and a logical organization for industry to penetrate. Re-establish Group Ops as a department at MSO/Group commands so that experts (or those working towards expertise) can be placed into the best area surrounded by other professionals in that field. Square peg in square hole kind of thing. Where no marine safety activity exists, establish as Group to coordinate SAR. Essentially, I suggest you undo the present organization and quickly. If marine safety is cut from the USCG by Congress or normal attrition, the public will suffer and the USCG will begin to be dis-established. SAR can be done by industry. Port defense can be done by DOD assets. The USCG is the most efficient federal agency there is. However, few will appreciate it until it is gone. For what it's worth. |
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Basic Training |
P.S. For anyone interested....those on active duty should lose the BDUs or fatigues or whatever you call them when in an office environment (Sector, subunit, District, Area or HQ). As a company executive, I don't appreciate wearing a business suit to visit the Sector Commander or District or HQ only to encounter senior office personnel dressed like an employee of Jiffy Lube. In the field conducting boardings or inspections is appropriate and professional but not in the office. Anyone in the private sector (or non-military govt) can tell you that there is power (or not) in how one dresses. If I am wearing a business suit and you are in fatigues, no matter how many stars or stripes you have, I am looking down at you. If you want respect off the battle field, dress appropriately. Like the previous remarks...this is for what it is worth.
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Basic Training |
OCS275 has valid points. The reality is that the present knowledge & experience base of the Marine Safety mission has been on 'life support' for a very long time. The sector command structure will just continue to water down the marine safety mission - after all, it's just one of many missions the sector commander worries about. One day, you'll watch on TV as an equivalent of the Minneapolis interstate bridge collapse occurs. Fingers will be pointed, some mid-level manager (most likely a sector commander) will get blamed, and Congress will finally push the button and separate the Marine Safety program to enforce safety concerns - while the USCG does its new and important security-related missions under homeland security. Something has to give here - the USCG infrastructure (bases, ships and aircraft) are fairly old and worn, mistakes have been made concerning service life extensions and renovations to the 110 foot fleet, contracting under deepwater, etc. This doesn't mean that the CG is a bad service or that upper management doesn't care. It simply points to a service trying to do everything with finite resources - so it does things like maritime safety sort of OK - usually. I believe it is actually in the interest of the country to have a viable and vibrant Maritime Safety program - and it does not have to be run by the USCG to work well. The Department of Transportation seems like the appropriate location with a civilian manned agency (i.e., Remember the Bureau of Marine Inspection? How about EPA for pollution? What about the FAA for aviation safety?). Congress and industry are on the right track - it's just slow getting there from here until the BIG ONE happens. Let's use the FAA as an example of what will (I hope) eventually happen. Keep in mind that the FAA is responsible for aircraft safety, air traffic control, etc. The FAA has a small cadre of civilians (civil servants) that are hired away from the industry to provide safety oversight of the airline industry and its employees who work in the industry. This is all run under the Department of Transportation. FAA inspector-type employee training and experience? Employees typically have years of experience in actual industry supplemented with OJT, schools, industry forums, etc. Oversight? Each owner, mechanic, and plane crew has to observe strict guidelines and document all maintenance of planes that now cost just as much as ships do - strict certification standards exist as well for employees. If planes were falling out of the sky daily, this safety scheme would be heavily changed. I personally think that a similar organization could be put in place to oversee port operations, ship inspections, pollution control, etc. Bottom line: I believe alternatives exist to improve maritime safety that could work well for this country - and allow the Coast Guard to focus on maritime security.
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Basic Training |
I think you and OCS 275 are smoking dope. OCS--you go ahead an look down your nose at the uniform wearing service, we can't afford business suits to rise to your level of grandeur as you meet with some retiring commander to negotiate whittling away regulatory safeties for more business suit money. How dare you show such contempt for the service? Bridge inspector in Minnesote was probably a civilian wasn't s/he? How'd that work out? FAA-please see the other business in front of the committee around the Commandant's visit: http://transportation.house.gov/News/PRArticle.aspx?NewsID=138 No one of you has read the report of the Marine Electric have you? I like the idea of marine inspectors transferring, it keeps relationships from getting too close, and bad interpretations and personnel from making local decisions that lead to destruction of consistency. There are definite problems with the program, and the good news is that the problem isn't so much with the field. It's more about the center, and, yes, the leadership. Lack of good training, lack of standardization teams, lack of consistent guidance, lack of job aids that keep track with the times, failure of the CG to keep track with IMO changes. But it's hard to fault the leadership for it all. We have all those regulatory projects becasue the CG practices so much outreach and conciliatory approaches to industry that the groups that testified know they can stonewall, and force delays a few years, and that a motivated person in charge of the reg project will move (happily no doubt). I say get a strong center of pro-mariners to handle the guidance, the standarization, and the regs---leave the field alone. Industry wouldn't be screaming unless they wanted something--the maritime casualties are not on the rise, so why are they complaining? Could it be money? Do you really think they want more experienced and knowledgeable inspectors for more detailed oversight? Military versus civilian plays little part, but OK, let's compare, anyone familiar with EPA versus CG spill response want to trade? I doubt it. |
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personally my big reason for not wanting any loss of the marine safety missions, is I think it opens the door for congress to start taking other missions away I.E. ATON, SAR, fisheries and before you know it the Coast Guard is just a floating border patrol. there are definately some problems right now but none that cant be fixed before its to late, just my opinion though
HAPPY 217 th B-DAY ! to all |
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Basic Training |
++ I honestly do not recall any recent events where the EPA was criticized for failing to adequately clean up an industry release, given the reality of funding levels. The CG is in a similar wicket - we could do much more if the billions to remove and dispose of a couple thousand abandoned barges on the Mississippi, in Houston, in Beaumont, etc. was available. Again, plenty of blame to go around for everyone - just try to think of what is best for the country, vice USCG or industry. ++ |
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Basic Training |
SteamshipIS misunderstood my remarks. I never want or wanted the USCG in civilian attire. The USCG is military and should look that way. In fact, it has been a long time pet peeve that the public doesn't see the USCG as military. My point was that office personnel should be wearing appropriate and equivalent uniforms to business attire, particualry when meeting with businesses. To "dress down" (which BDUs portray to the "outside) is to relinguish some of your perceived authority and it reduces other's respect for you. I was trying to help you see how others see you and help you regain the respect you are losing. I regret your misunderstanding of my remarks.
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Just like OCS, I too have retired after a successful Coast Guard career of almost 30 years. I also work in the Industry now. The wheels on this bus have been coming off for quite a while now.
When the 9/11 disaster occurred, the CG should have realized then that they were behind the eight ball. You cannot keep adding mission, after mission, after mission to your duties and NOT add personnel and funding to support it. I was stationed at the Group/COTP in GOVIS in 1994, right after the first World Trade Center bombing. As a result, most of the persons in senior positions took advantage of the training that was offered by the NY/NJ Port Authority concerning ICS. Where did they go after? On to other jobs and assignments and kept that knowledge and experience with them. Who DID keep that knowledge? The Reserve component, who are the continuity and experience but are looked down upon in a lot of instances, but I found as a mid-level manager an invaluable resource for local knowledge (and since there were a lot of cops and firemen, good jokes too!) and experience. With few exceptions, most of these guys’s were looked down upon, disrespected and most seriously, not given the opportunity to share that knowledge. Going back even further to Desert Shield/Storm, the Reserve component of the 9th District did a good job (although some Buffalo folks were a wart) establishing the deployable PSU's. In fact I served with the current Commandant aboard the CGC Gallatin in the mid-70’s and know him to be an extremely knowledgeable, thorough and truly caring individual. Had I not retired, I would be glad to serve with him again. But, I do not envy him the task set out for him for the rest of his final tour. I know that he will do his level best for all of you on duty and for the reputation of the Coast Guard. I also believe that another time bomb is ticking out there. In the field of L/E and Port Security, whose lines are blending into the OCMI/COTP authority under the “new” Sector command scheme. Since the early 80’s when the focus shifted towards more military functions under Admiral Yost and also on the Reagan era “War on drugs”, then HMIO our younger personnel were given increasing levels of authority and responsibility. They were given some minimal training and competency to meet, yet as shipboard and station level personnel were required to perform their true traditional rating functions as well. This is a mission that due solely to the sweat equity of those E-6 and below, that 29 and under age group, that the stress of carrying a weapon into numerous and varied scenarios, have avoided a mistake/lapse of judgment to occur, that could cause a disastrous loss of life. I’m sorry but MLE school and 50 or 100 rounds of ammo per weapon are NOT adequate training to perform this mission. I know that additional training developed over time, fisheries, boat tactics, laws and treaties and on, and on… But when you compare that training to other Federal Law Enforcement personnel, especially the senior leadership, the CG is woefully and perhaps behind. It will take several years to attain personnel and experience levels to sustain these missions. My gripe? Unless things have changed drastically you won’t find questions on the MK/BM/GM Service Wide exam and/or the other traditional ratings that still remain. Until these mission priorities are given autonomy as a free standing rate, and those who chose this path allowed the time to focus specifically on these mission competencies, the Petty Officers are going to suffer. Those who want to excel as a L/E guru, suffer because they are not reviewing materials or procedures required for them to advance in their rating. Worse still would be to not do anything, and sure as heck someone is going to make a mistake that is going to cost a life. It’s Murphy’s Law, I just don’t know how the CG has been able to retain that luck, other than the dedication of those people in the field. Bore clear, a bunch of words expended and no casualties (yet) My two cents, your turn, fire away. P.S. – And if you don’t think that the Marine Industry feeling the burn. Buy yourself a TWIC, out of pocket. It’s only $135.00, chump change, right? Jeeze, talk about a knee jerk reaction! |
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Basic Training |
First off, let me say that I’ll bet the folks w/ Deepwater are thrilled that another CG program is getting hammered for a change.
Second, any views expressed below are mine and are in no way meant to slight the many dedicated, hardworking folks we have in this program. Without them, we’d be far worse off than we are now. I’ve watched this debate with some interest as I’ve long felt (even before 9/11) that Vessel Inspections and Marine Investigations would be best handled by another agency that would commit the resources and support it needs to make it viable and credible. Even if the CG were to keep it, I don’t feel it should be managed under a ‘military’ structure because it’s too inefficient and bureaucratic. I actually read the transcript of the testimony the Comdt gave on the hill recently and will be interested to see what he comes back with in 60 days. Two of the other entities that spoke are from this area so I am very familiar with their stance (OMSA and Mr. Block). However, it all boils down to the same old arguments we’ve been making for years. This program is cyclical and unfortunately it usually doesn’t get the attention it needs until after a notable casualty happens. I’ve always compared it to a clock where after MARINE ELECTRIC and the EXXON VALDEZ we were near the 6 o’clock position, then it comes up a bit towards 12 o’clock but then, invariably, heads towards 6 again. Right now we have got to be between 5:30 and 6. I’ve only been in M, specifically Inspections and Investigations having come in via Direct Commission w/ Third Mate’s license. I had some industry and commercial sea time before I came in and I maintain a lot of contacts in industry through classmates who still sail and work shoreside. If the CG is to keep this program, this is what I would like to see happen: -Increase tour lengths: 3 years is barely enough time to get qualified in larger ports. Then, given that the training philosophy varies port to port, folks are often shuffled off to some other dept so they become marginally qualified but are not given the time to fully develop into the kind of Inspector/Investigator we need to make this program credible. There are exceptions, of course, but this is the norm. When I came in back in ’93 the Training Port concept existed. ACIDs and CIDs were of the O-4 and O-5 variety. While I had some exposure to the industry and felt comfortable in my job, I was in awe of the talent we had back then. Now it is rare to see someone in that job over the rank of LT unless you are at a larger port. In order to increase tour lengths, the decision has to be made how to make a career track of Insp/Inv and how best to blend the workforce, so that takes me to… -Staffing: In the Comdt’s testimony the term “blended workforce” appeared repeatedly. The emphasis seemed to be on bringing more CIVs in. There was some minor discussion on the value of Maritime Grads/Licensed folks as well. I have a little bias here but I feel that bringing former mariners in is absolutely essential. I would like to see them brought in at the upper GS levels at least and/or bring back the 219 program. Recent maritime grads are good too as they should have a decent familiarity with the industry but getting folks who actually spent time in it (recently) needs to happen. We need people who understand how commercial vessels operate and the world of work of the mariner. I had a CO once who said ‘knowing who and what you regulate makes you a better regulator’. Just after he said that he bid me bon voyage as I set sail on an LNG carrier from AK to Japan. He was a huge advocate of the Shiprider program and he wanted me to learn all I could about LNG ops and how other ports handled it (this was before 9/11). It ranks up there as one of the top 5 most rewarding things I’ve done in the CG. Along with staffing comes a staffing model…something that has never existed in M. Someone needs to agree to a metric that says how many MIs and IOs a port needs given a certain workload. Here in the Gulf portion of D8 we have the highest domestic workload and amount of new construction in the country, yet it is totally disproportionate when you consider the amount of personnel we have to deal with it. At my unit alone we had just over 2800 inspection activities last year and average between 55-60 new construction projects (many are large full SOLAS OSVs and not simple barges). I have 11 MIs to deal with that and not all are qual’d at any given time due to the nature of our rotations, etc. I can list a number of places (and even some districts) off the top of my head that don’t have anywhere near that kind of ratio. If we aren’t bringing more folks in then someone needs to come up with a model fast and reshuffle the deck. If not for ACP and 10-82 we simply could not manage. If that won’t happen then we need more workload reduction measures or greater OCMI discretion to shed lower risk activities (like 2nd and 4th year reinspections, etc.). -Training: a training port system or national model needs to exist. Leaving it up to the individual units to put their own spin on training isn’t working. It literally is all over the map and very ‘hit and miss’ depending upon where one has their first tour. It is unfortunate that MSM Vol. I is so dated as it does have some good, valid direction in it. No one adheres to it because it’s not been revised in almost 2 decades. I’ll get more into policy later… As far as our national model goes, the MI/IO school in Yorktown does the best they can with what they are given but this school would be better if it was located at one of the union campuses (MITAGS or MEBA) or similar. These facilities have all the simulators and students could interact with the mariners they are supposed to regulate. We proved this during the surge training we did for MTSA/ISPS when we held the classes at MITAGS. Additional, follow-on training for certain ship types is still best held at the “centers of excellence”, e.g. Miami for cruise ships, Louisiana for MODUs, etc. This concept should be expanded and the units involved should be adequately funded and staffed to do the training. Further, our MIs and IOs should have much of the same type of training that mariners get, especially w/ STCW. Funny that we mandate it and regulate it but don’t practice it or put our own folks through it. This should be fundamental training for our IOs, especially considering the vast majority of them have no commercial sea time. I’m not necessarily advocating the full suite of STCW but bits and pieces of most of the courses, especially Advanced Fire Fighting and Bridge Resource Mgmt. Lastly, our IOs must have some time as MIs before going to the IO shop. This is actually spelled out in MSM I and the (draft) MSM V. For some reason the concept that this needs to be the next level of training after one has some time as an MI has been lost for the most part…however, there are still places that do it right. Shipriding should be a required part of some quals. This is also discussed in MSM Vol. 1 and some ports have made it a ‘check off’ to a major designator. Unfortunately finding the time to do it with everything else an MI in training has to do is tough. Worse, some places even view it with disdain thinking that it’s getting too ‘chummy’ with the industry and borderline unethical. That kind of thinking is retarded. For those MIs and IOs who have no commercial sea-time (even those with military sea time should do it as the nature of commercial vs. military ops underway are about as far apart as you can get) this is invaluable given that it could be done in a meaningful and structured manner vice just hanging out in the officer’s lounge playing video games the whole time. Policies: our set of MSMs needs work!!! The fact that they get neglected for so long is indicative of the state we’re in. There are well-meaning folks at HQ who want to get after this but it is always in competition with everything else they have to do…then, before you know it, the tour is up and the next person inherits it. I’ve been hearing for years how MSM II will be a ‘living’ document and incorporate most all policy. Would love to see it. MSM V needs to be signed and implemented. This was actually one that was extensively revised in the not too distant past and has been waiting for signature for, what, over 6 years now?? How can this be? While it’s all still valid policy it gets harder every year to convince the new folks why we still use it as they get confused by staff symbols used 3-4 reorganizations ago… The solution is to make MSM II a living document and incorporate all the NVICs and policy letters into it. Yes, we still use old NVICs but when you have 7-68 talking about ultrasonic gauging being subject to approval by the OCMI it really should force us to take a hard look a the dated, legacy stuff out there and get it updated. MSM I needs to be revised to reflect the current Sector structure and detail the progression of training to those new to the program. MSM III needs updating to capture all the latest in licensing and MSM IV…I wouldn’t even know where to begin. There is much more but I simply wanted to chime in on this discussion while I had some of these thoughts in my head. I do believe the CG can be successful with the Inspection and Investigation programs if we can get the funding, staffing and support at the highest levels of leadership we need. We will have to see what the Comdt comes back with and go from there. One thing is sure, something has to happen and soon. The industry and the country deserve better. Yes, moving this responsibility wholesale to another agency would be a huge lift and may create problems of it’s own but the time has come to make those hard decisions. This program has always been looked down upon by the organization as a whole. Historically it’s where you went when you needed a break from going to sea, couldn’t hack it at sea or when you got washed out of flight school. Some of that mentality still exists and we only get the attention we need after something bad happens. There’s a better way to do it and we can’t figure it out then it needs to go to another agency that can. |
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I've also read the testimony from the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee hearing on August 2nd. “Standby for heavy rolls”, for a while any way. I’m pretty impressed with the testimony of Rep. Cummings, he appears to see the issues clearly and his thoughts seem pretty accurate. And I agree that the Deepwater folks should enjoy the short respite. I honestly think that given the right structure, staffing and focus the Coast Guard "is" the agency to continue oversight of the Marine Safety Program.
The last few years of trying to blend the various field missions into one hat at the Sector level is a major mistake. Just having one person with COTP/OCMI authority is an awesome responsibility. When you add the PWSA/Magnuson stuff with the current anti-terrorism focus and ELT authority, most field units are not staffed to be as proficient as they should be in BOTH of those. At the Petty Officer levels, getting someone who can digest all of the Pollution Investigation/Response, Port State and on, and on quals and experience (especially the non-MST), then qualify and BTM/BO, Cox'n/Eng/crew and on, and on is a huge undertaking. Hold their feet to the fire, and get all the tickets punched and it "is" time to move on. Traditional ratings can't use any of the "M" stuff for advancement! Where is the motivation, other than the typical Coastie drive to do their job to the best of their ability. We have the right people, they just need the right leadership and provided with the right tools. Then look at the Junior Officers. They are met with the same expectations to punch their qual tickets and focus on a career path, AND manage a collateral duty burden to boot! At some of the smaller units, I've seen JO's transfer out with one or two quals, and those are little more than having finished their check rides. Did the CO who allowed you ride the LNG advance any farther than the rank he was at the time? I'll assume that it was O-6 or O-5? He sounds like someone who had his ear to the ground and tried to provide you access to the learning tools. Not many are willing to do that anymore. At least not the ones that expect to move up and have access to the tools THEY need to turn that corner. Someone sitting outside of the box watching this, Deepwater, Marine Safety, ALJ administrative process will be thinking that the wheels are falling off. "We" know that they are not, but "we" also see the holes, the frustration and the heavy mission burden that the field unit personnel are struggling to maintain. I hope the Committee realizes that ADM Allen is one who will make things happen. I hope that the staff that ADM Allen has, has the knowledge and experience to make rational and informed plans, policies and recommendations to him to allow him to propose the right course change. I’ve crossed over to the “dark” side now (kidding) and I am truly amazed at the level of apprehension and distrust has toward the Coast Guard. Especially up here in the brown water. Shoving that TWIC regulation down their throat and the timing was not opportune, believe me. The development process for the Subchapter M regulations might be the salve needed to allow us settle down and change course with you. |
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The CG isn't shoving TWIC down anyone's throats. We're just the messenger. I'm rather surprised to hear that CG is the focus of anger in your area regarding TWIC. We've received nothing but compliments on the TWIC outreach we've done in Baltimore.
I could not agree with this more. I said this in my first year of doing MI work. I think the main reason I adamently oppose the seperations is the cost, both in money and potential lives. The Marine Safety mission is so intertwined that pulling it away will leave bloody stubs. It will also cost millions, possibly billions to stand up/expand another agency. As a steward of the taxpayer dollar, I find this unacceptable. Then there is the lapse. As with any agency that assumes new responsibilities, there is growing pains. My worry is that as a new/expanded agency gets its feet under itself, there will be significant holes in oversight. I believe the best solution is to fix the problems, not create new ones that come with the a new/expanded agency assuming this mission. |
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