The past two CMCs have addressed the problem as us being "out gunned and out classed" in weapons and range. HIMARS brings a new capability but how useful it will be in a more conventional type conflict is yet to be seen. The M777 is also still fairly new and has its share of problems but it promises to be an excellent tube as it breaks into the Fleet.

This leaves us with the real issue of manning and using trained specialists in non traditional roles they're not properly trained for. Artillery has always been a true force multiplier in any contest but how can Marine Artillery ever truly be useful when the very skill sets which make it so premier become lost due to such wasteful mismanagement?

A better course is to deploy as usual and execute fire missions in support of ambushed or IED'd convoys. While it's true that many actions are in crowded city streets, many more are not so where is the justification in not using our traditional fire support to "break 'em up?" Lets use common sense here. How many hostiles are going to sit on a perch waiting for the exact moment to set off an IED if they're faced with the possibility of incoming? What happened to our walls of steel as a deterrent to hostile actions?

Until we stop fooling around and get back on track we're running the risk of losing one of our most valuable assets in any contest. For those of you who think you've only fired rounds downrange, believe theres a lot of your Brother Grunts who are eternally grateful for the life saving fires you've provided. Artillery is no second hand force to be squandered, you're a true player on any playground anywhere in the world.

As the old Marine saying goes "don't fix it if it ain't broke!"

I dont think it is a problem of being "out gunned and out classed" in weapons and range. The M-198 was state of the art when first deployed, but as with anything, over time, newer and better systems, i.e. M-777 have been developed. HIMARS was developed to replace the General Support/ General Support Reinforcing role that was given to the M-198 when the SPs went away. Back in the mid 80s before they were decommed, the USMC had 155mm SP and 8" SP guns in that role (4/10 and 5/10 in 10th Marines). I remember shooting an 8" Battery at CAX. Very accurate. I got a direct hit on one target, made a 30 meter deviation correction and got another direct hit. When you are getting steel on steel, it is impossible to be out gunned.

Fifteen years later we are still dealing with the Clinton cut-backs. By not having a sufficient number of personnel in any MOS or a lesser number of units of a particular type, that forces units to perform duties that they are not normally trainined in. But isn't that why we as Marines have that reputation. By every Marine being a rifleman (not infantryman, this is not that argument), even though their specialty is not Infantry or MP, they still can be tasked those missions, and they are doing them well. True, Artillery has always been a force multiplyer, since the scope of this conflict has changed from all out combat against a known foe to an anti-insurgent conflict, the need for artillery in the traditional role is not needed as much. The need for Marines on the ground outweigh the need for cannon in the field. After returning from Iraq, the batteries resume their METL training to get their skills back up to speed.

While I agree that a Battery should take it's guns with them, or complete a turnover with the next Battery coming in, the use of artillery in these situations is somewhat limited. It is extremely impractacle to throw a couple of rounds downrange when the incident occurs on a city street, but out in the countryside, it is also impractacle. The numerous ways that an IED can be set off, preclude the possibility that artillery can be used as "counter ied fire". Hard wired, cell phones, radios, etc. can all be set up so that the initiator is far away from the device itself. What happened to our walls of steel as a deterrent to hostile actions? We are dealing with a different type of mentality. What would be the difference between the suicide bomber that walks into a crowded market and the bomber that waits for the convoy and the subsequent "counter ied fire" from a Battery. In their warped ideology, if you kill infidels and die in the process, you are on that express elevator to heaven.

If this were a conventional conflict, I beleive that the traditional set up of a MEU/MEB/MEF would work well. The Marine Corps was never intended to be an occupying army, since the Army is short handed also, they need the additional resources that the Marine Corps brings to the table. But, since the need for Marines on the ground outweighs the need for the traditional roles, they will continue to complete the job admirably no matter the circumstances.

I totally agree that the Arty Kids have really stepped up and are doing a great job with the task at hand. I also agree that leaving their tubes behind is crazy for the simple fact that if hostile suddenly fields galvanized forces in concentrated attacks we're going to lose good Marines while they're gear is being flown in from the States.

Where I do disagree with you is that every hostile has the mentality of a "mad bomber." I rather see them more as "defending their homeland" types while others are just going along with it much like our own protestors of the late sixties.

I personally would have stood down the GSR battalions and reassigned their roles to DS in order to stand up more infantry and increase battalion strength. That would have given us larger units to cover the same AOs which in turn would have cut the number of deploying units.

At this point in the war where its almost over I would have begun restanding up Arty billets in a more balanced force.

Without their tubes an Expeditionary Force is not, as their self contained war fighting ability is diminished.
As already stated on this thread, firing batteries should either take their tubes, or inherit those of the rotating battery.
The issue of what piece is fielded was indeed made simpler by the advent of the M-198. 10th Marines, for instance, for a time fielded M-114's, M-109's, and M-110's in the 1985/1986 time frame. I also believe that 10th Marines still had a 105 battery (M-102's maybe??).

My name is Duncan, I was with India 3/10 from November of 1982 until March of 1985. I did a Med float to Beruit with BLT 2/6 22nd Mau. On that particular float we took the M114a2 Howitzer with us. It was of world war 2 vintage. It had a ratchet stlye base plate lowering system. We were on Air Alert when I first arrived We had a batttery of 6 m101 105mm howitzers parked in the parking lot while our 155's were in the old gun park by browns field. The rest of the regiment had a majority of M114's at that time as the M198 was slowly being deliverd to 10th Marines in January of 1982. In 1983 we got our M198's to go on my second float with BLT 1/8 22nd Mau we first trained with them at Fort Picket Virginia then 29 palms then at Lejeune to finish our Readyness test. we deployed with 8 M198's. Later I transfered to Bravo 1/10 India redeployed in 1985 and took 6 M198'S and 4 M101 guns. India shot out in the fall of 1983 indeed killing a Lieutenant Colonel's wife. I heard the story many times as it happend about 8 weeks before I arrived.I knew all the culprits. It was the powder man's fault. This is where the SOP for Safety NCO's had arisen from. The powder man was discharged after he had about 7 office hours about a year after that happend. I was a witness at an office hour for him. If anyone is interested I will explain how it was explained to me. 27 years later.

This is a little dated but as I understand it it's still the way things are happening.

http://forums.military.com/eve/forums/a/tpc/f/672198221/m/7760094141001

The only difference between now and then is now that unit is a rocket battery.