Great article. You know, it's one thing when politicians and defense contractors push new programs over necessary ones; it's quite another when high-ranking officers do it. It's been clear for a long time that attack helicopters, AC-130's, and A-10's need to be a bigger priority.
Agree with the author.Enough with the whizz(F-22) lets have some more BANG(A-10). Big fan of simple(all weather), effective(servicible),long flying time (range) attack aircraft.Like the AD and the A-10. Anybody remember the Cessna Dragonfly A-37?
We do need a COIN aircraft that can operate from austere, unpaved fields, requires low maintenance, has a long loiter time, and can carry a load of ordnance. Other than the A-10, we have nothing.
This article reminds me of a Military Channel show on some SF troops in Desert Storm who got discovered deep in Iraq. They did escape with the aid of some F-16s. However, the F-16s did not go below 15,000 feet, perhaps because of their own ROE. You cannot do really effective CAS from that altitude. Four old AD-1 Spads or A-37s would have been much better, as would A-10s.
Mach 1+ super-cruise, stealth, and variable geometry vectored thrust all have their applications, but not in COIN operations. Let's get an aircraft that is simple, reliable, and effective.
And thus "Effects-based Operations" were born. By accurately bombing from high altitude the right strategic and tactical targets, air power could cause an effect that would force the enemy into submission. The Gulf War proved the thesis, the wars in Yugoslavia and Kosovo furthered it, the Iraq war threw it into doubt -- and now the Afghan war has tossed it out the window.
Effects-based Operations will only work with an enemy that has placed a high value on technology to wage war. When the assets are taken out - the enemy is effectively blind. In Afghanistan, the enemy barely uses any technology at all - hence much of the advanced capabilities we have are rendered all but useless (or otherwise are compromised).
There were a set of war games conducted several years ago that played out our high-tech forces against an adversary that was only allowed to use what the Iranians have. For example, the opposing force used motorcycles to relay messages - which completely left the high-tech forces in the dark, and cost so much damage to capital assets that the games were stopped because the opposing force apparently didn't cooperate as expected.
W/r/t the A-10, the USAF was trying to get rid of them even in the early 1990's, in favor of using F-16's that not only couldn't loiter, but were too fast for the job, and unarmored. The first Gulf War really demonstrated that the A-10 was a formidible weapon that scared the daylights out of the Iraqi's (hence - the USAF brass ate roasted crow for many a supper). Use of low-tech solutions that work cannot ever be discounted - especially when the adversary is also low-tech. War is dirty business and you have to get dirty to win.
And where the Spad suffered somewhat in Viet Nam - it is important to remember that the N. Vietnamese had a government with access to serious AA systems. The Taliban does not have this advantage (to my knowledge).
Tried and true, tough and reliable. Instead of built for fancy airfields with no "chaff" within the perimeter. Remember one of the things the Ruskies had over us was their aircraft's ability to continue flying with all kinds of debris and FOD in their operational areas. New and Progressive is not always necessarily better. But, it is always more costly. Isn't it a little strange that some of the best developmental uses of our older aircraft and equipment came from NCO's and Staff NCO's in the actual theatre of operations. Want something that works for the "boots" on the ground, ask them and their NCO's, and junior Officers, not some politician or procurement General sitting in a $2000 chair, behind a $10,000 desk in the luxurious offices of the House, Senate, or Pentagon.
I was just recently thinking the same thing after I watched a show on the Military channel profiling the A-1 Skyraider, with the focus mainly on Vietnam ops.
I have always been aware of this plane and have seen quite a few over the years at airshows and such, but I was amazed at how long these planes could remain on station for CAS support.
Of course, the cost would be huge to re-tool or would it? It would be perfect to have such an aircraft in Afghanistan.
Agree with Policywonk that the NVA and VC had much better AA capabilities than the insurgents do.
If you have ever been in the field, and three of the A-10 come up over a hill at two hundred feet, it will scare the HLL of of you, especially with they start letting loose. They are very SWEET deals, love them in action. A really good solution to close air support.
