See above link. This is an excellent article about Lockheed and the C4ISR electronic problems.
Yes Mr. Mike Dekort, "topside equipment" means the C4ISR systems you identified as faulty. It can't be the stern launch system for the small boat. The Coast Guard has not been on previous record stating that the stern launch is faulty.
So what other "topside equipment" installed in the 123 WPB contract can the Coast Guard be referencing in its letter to Mr. Kevin O'Neil of ICGS? The Coast Guard has to be specific about its allegations on "topside equipment" in order for it to legally file a complaint and then a claim. It can't pretend to look responsible with this letter (and placate the IG), at the same time be intentionally vague in order to protect Lockheed and the questionable C4ISR systems. Congress won't allow that. And one could assume that press and media won't allow it as well.
Ed, you needed to read the transcript to the Congressional Hearings. The VP of ICGS (Jaime Anton) stated that there was no facts to prove the ICGS was responsible for the structural problems with the 123 WPB, hence if the Coast Guard returned the boats, ICGS was not liable to fix them.
So what other "topside equipment" installed in the 123 WPB contract can the Coast Guard be referencing in its letter to Mr. Kevin O'Neil of ICGS? The Coast Guard has to be specific about its allegations on "topside equipment" in order for it to legally file a complaint and then a claim. It can't pretend to look responsible with this letter (and placate the IG), at the same time be intentionally vague in order to protect Lockheed and the questionable C4ISR systems. Congress won't allow that. And one could assume that press and media won't allow it as well.
Well said Mr. Jones. Of course, keeping it intentionally vague also protects the USCG as well doesn't it?
Well 1110, I would say it would be hard for the Coast Guard to deny that "topside equipment" does not mean C4ISR systems. Like I said, the only other topside equipment that was installed by ICGS on the 123 WPB is related to the stern launch system for small boat. And the Coast Guard had never publicly identified this system as faulty.
[QUOTE]Originally posted by NYC_Coastie: The four posts above did not answer my question.
Again, when the boats were first experiencing hull problems why weren't the boats sent back to Bollinger so Bollinger could evaluate the hull problem? Bollinger originally built the boats and Bollinger did the 110 foot to 123 foot conversion. Shouldn’t Bollinger have had a chance to correct the problem?
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Ed, you know the government contracting rules. ICGS stated before Congress that it was not responsible for the hull problems. That told the Coast Guard the hull problems would not be under warranty coverage. Then what does the government legally do with respect to the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR)? It would have to go out for bids to conduct work that is outside the 123 WPB contract and warranty. Yes, it could have done a "sole source justification" to bring the boats there for the repairs, but there may be reasons why that didn't happen.
Well Mr. Ed, the USCG current line of thinking is the persons responsible for that decision are either no longer with the Deepwater program or are retired, therefore cannot be held accountable.
The "REAL" 100 million dollar question is why did the USCG proceed with six more 110 to 123 conversions despite known significant structural problems with the first two boats which were done?
Originally posted by NYC_Coastie: What is interesting about the 123 story is that if the electronics were the only problem the boats could have been easily fixed and returned to service. It seems that with the replacement of cables and addition of a few cameras the boats could be easily brought back into spec.
Almost, Mr. Ed. According to many sources in the C4I workforce community, the 123's had numerous problems in meeting NSA TEMPEST requirements by not only poor workmanship by the contractors, but also poor design. If certain standards had not been circumvented and the job had been done correctly from the beginning, yes, perhaps they could have been brought back into service (although not exactly "easily" if you read the reports).
Originally posted by NYC_Coastie: First: electronics issues are not why the 123s were taken out of service. It was the hull issues. Any good manager could put together a team to address the electronics issues.
There are some at the NSA who would beg to differ with that statment Mr. Ed. Had the C4I issues became known to the public before the structural issues, the NSA nor the Navy would not have sat by and let those boats operate, compromising the nation's COMSEC, classified information and cipher codes. The USCG would have still been forced to tie them up.
The minute the hulls of the 110s were breached to add the 13 feet they were doomed as floating, operational units. Their length never should have been altered...WHY? During their life they were operated at twice their expected operational life and essentially treated as if they were a MEC instead of a WPB. These were Coastal Patrol Boat type designs yet due to the operational needs of the service they were used and abused (not by the crews - in an operational sense). Go back through history and look at the 210' Medium Endurance Cutter - original designation - WPC for patrol craft; with a 2 - 3 week maximum underway at a time design.
Although there were serious TEMPEST issues identified as Ed says those could have been fixed - communicationscabling, shielding, cameras - those don't stop a ship from sailing (unless they present other safety issues) but a terribly designed and rebuild on an aging hull - that is a bad thing.
1110, whatever your professional area of expertise is, you view is too narrowly focused on the issue of what is wrong with Deepwater; instead of continually beating the proverbial dead horse and crying for a head on a platter, what are your thoughts about fixing Deepwater so it can accomplish its goal of completely overhauling the assets of the Coast Guard? The old adage - part of the problem or the solution; well if you're stuck in the problem (i.e. beating drums about how bad it is) then you aren't contributing to the solution.
Who has valid suggestions on how to steer Deepwater back on course? It gets old seeing finger waggling all the time.
Nobodyaskemebut, I'd start by suspending the process of the USCG and contractors "self-certifying" work that they are not trained or qualified to be.
All projects associated with ICGS and with Lockheed Martin should come to a standstill until all Coast Guard assets have been completely brought up to par, and completely re-inspected from scratch using independent, honest brokers who have a decades long track history of following standardized, exacting requirements (i.e., INSURV).
Further USCG contracts should specify not only the scope of the work, but what standards the contractor is required to meet before the project is rubber-stamped as "accepted".
All the above 3 issues came to light in the DHS IG report and in the recent Congressional Hearings.
My training and background is in Combat Systems, C4I and EW, so yes I admitedly tend to focus on those issues.
This message has been edited. Last edited by: 1110,
Originally posted by 14778989: All the key issues with the 123's was the hull and the shafts, not the C4ISR systems. They did work!
They worked? Wow, you need to read that letter the Coast Guard sent recently to Integrated Coast Guard Systems that contradicts your statement. Open this link to learn more:
quote: "Bible's reply, on June 5, dropped a bomb: "In addition to the hull buckling and shaft alignment problems identified in the May 17 letter, the revocation is also based on . . . class-wide issues, including non-conforming topside equipment."
The letter is a legal issue CG to LMCO and is done IAW the ICGS contract that said let me get on a soap box for a few....
Lets just step back and look at this from a history point of view. All the cutters out there on patrol never have CASREP's, The MK92 works 100% of the time, CMPLUS is great and lets not forget the greatest program ever fielded LEIS. 32 footers are the backbone of the sector HLS fleet. Not one Polar boats ever regularly spend months in the shipyard. The reduction gears on every 378 are fantastic as well and the EW and weapon systems. O and TPAX/UTS and direct access worked great out of the box. My point here is yes, there are problems with every systems ever fielded, some are big and some are small and the 123's, shore upgrades and the WMSL are no different than every other CG system/ asset out there(I don't want to go into the air side of the house). The CG installed systems that up to that point, were only installed on Large heavily manned Cutters and manned by Rates that had never worked with these types of systems. Remember the rate structure on the 123's was BM, MK, FS, GM, and EM(an IT was added in the last months of the program). Also several of the top side antennas and other gear were REUSE. Meaning in order to save money and schedule the CG directed/agreed to the reuse of the equipment that was taken off the 110's before they went in the yard for the conversion. As for the hulls lets look at that. The Coast Guard would never leave a Cutter out in conditions the hull is not rated for Ever. Need to ask the crew of 1303 on her first trip to Key West. Also the NSC is to work in Sea State 5 and survive sea state 7 by the contract. We ran the 82's and the 95's in to the ground and we are doing it to the 270's, 210's and the 378's. Until we can have a equal balance of available cutters to patrol hours demanded we will continue the downward curve even with new boats. The 123's were always meant to be a stop gap till the FRC was rolling out of the yard. One other point is the age of the cutters the CG selected for the 123 program. I feel we should have selected all C class boats but did not. As a person that was there I can tell you there is blame to go around. but do the math, when was the last time the Coast Guard has fielded a major cutter class. I will give you a hint it was the 270's and it has taken over over 15 years to get them and there systems up to the level they are today and with out the added requirments from 9/11. Like it or not, given the current government contracting environment and the 10's of thousand of pages of regulations as mandated by congress(many of which are contactor friedly) this is were we are and have to go. The old mindsets of the Coast Guard need to change as much as our systems. Too many people out there want Deepwater to fail due to for the lack of a better term, rice bowls. I have been there and seen it. We need to look at the problems and work to find the coordinated solution. Deepwater is invasive to every command in the CG and that sometimes is in it self the root to all of this defending rice bowls and securing credit. Thats it I am done for now, fire away.
14778989: That is funny. No where in your lengthy post do you speak of the culpability of Lockheed with all the C4ISR electronic problems let alone the abysmal management of ICGS with the 123 WPB project. From the outside, it looks like you want to re-direct focus on the Coast Guard's inner workings in order to avoid rightful criticism and legal action against the Contractors, Lockheed and Northrop.
You want to see a major cutter class that for the most part was delivered on schedule, within budget and within the requirements? Look at the 225 foot buoy tender class that was built by Marinette Marine.
It is not about internal rice bowl management within the Coast Guard. That again was a nice attempt of you to distract from the real issue, the culpability of Lockheed and Northrop.
No not at all, What LMCO and NGSS have done will be handled as per the ICGS contract and the provitions for disputes. I just want to stop the back and forth on just that issue and look back at the process. Once the design is through CDR that should be it. It never was after awhile we would start seeing the CG-1 thru who ever start changing things its to late. There is blame out there and thoughs will be held. I just wanted to point out this is not the first CG program to have problems like this. 225 is a good program but a better one is the 87 foot WPB and its past and current issues. The NSC will change the way we do the job. That first crew is the current agent of change.
Originally posted by 14778989: No not at all, What LMCO and NGSS have done will be handled as per the ICGS contract and the provitions for disputes. I just want to stop the back and forth on just that issue and look back at the process. Once the design is through CDR that should be it. It never was after awhile we would start seeing the CG-1 thru who ever start changing things its to late. There is blame out there and thoughs will be held. I just wanted to point out this is not the first CG program to have problems like this. 225 is a good program but a better one is the 87 foot WPB and its past and current issues. The NSC will change the way we do the job. That first crew is the current agent of change.
Please stop protecting the contractor. Read the IG report. You will see that the argument that they followed the requirements is futile. The Coast Guard has documented their failure to meet the requirements on topside equipment (i.e., C4I$R) in the letter sent by Ms Bible.
WELCOME USCGC BAIN BRIDGE ISLAND IS THE 43RD. ISLAND CLASS PATROL BOAT TO JOIN THE COAST GUARD FLEET AND IS NAMED AFTER BAINBRIDGE ISLAND BAINBRIDGE ISLAND LOCATED IN PUGET SOUND, WASHINGTON JUST WEST OF SEATTLE BAINBRIDGE ISLAND WASHINGTON COMBINES THE HISTORIC CHARM OF LUMBER MILLS. STRAWBERRY FIELDS AND WWII MILITARY BASES WITH RURAL, POSTORAL AMBIANCE SETTING THE ISLAND A-PART FROM THE BUSTLE OF THE BIG CITY NEXT DOOR THE ISLAND WAS ONCE THE PRIVATE HUNTING GROUND OF CHIEF KITSAP AND LATER NAMED BAIN BRIDGE ISLAND BY CAPTAIN VANCOUVER,
Originally posted by 1110: The "REAL" 100 million dollar question is why did the USCG proceed with six more 110 to 123 conversions despite known significant structural problems with the first two boats which were done?
Many questions, yes indeed.
I was on number 6 of the conversion, the Vashon. The above statement is not a fair statement. The first boat, the Matagorda, had many problems, BUT the significant problems didn't come up until after the Vashon had been received. It was only then that the problems were found in the other 5 ships. The problems with the Matagorda were thought to have been corrected. The Vashon was the boat that got all the fixes before leaving the yard. We were the one that was able to "learn" from all the others. I guess we could since we spent over a year and a half in the yards.
Although there are lots of problems with the various systems the main problems were the hulls and the shafts. The other systems did work, while I was onboard. Yes, they may have had problems, but that that was far short a cry to the epidemic hull problem. Those cutters were actually quite impressive besides the hull problems. The technology on them was incredible and better than anything I have seen in the Coast Guard.
It is really easy to read the "news" and take exactly what is said, but I was on one, and TAD on the others, and the "news" isn't always right on with what actually went on.
