quote:

Originally posted by Berlin93:
Ground truth. Thanks for posting it.

As General Petraeus has said -- there's no military solution to Iraq. Nobody in Iraq really is on our side and the Iraqis aren't grateful to us for anything we're doing for them.[/i]

quote:

Originally posted by FortesFortunaJuvat:

quote:

Originally posted by Berlin93:
Ground truth. Thanks for posting it.

As General Petraeus has said -- there's no military solution to Iraq. Nobody in Iraq really is on our side and the Iraqis aren't grateful to us for anything we're doing for them.[/i]

I didn't know General Petraeus had a crystal ball. No one knows the solution or how this thing is going to play out. That being the case, I'd rather go down with guns blazing than to get shot in the back

quote:

Originally posted by FortesFortunaJuvat:

quote:

Originally posted by Berlin93:
Ground truth. Thanks for posting it.

As General Petraeus has said -- there's no military solution to Iraq. Nobody in Iraq really is on our side and the Iraqis aren't grateful to us for anything we're doing for them.[/i]

I didn't know General Petraeus had a crystal ball. No one knows the solution or how this thing is going to play out. That being the case, I'd rather go down with guns blazing Than mount up cowboy??? You wouldn't want to be considered a CHICKENhawk would ya??? than to get shot in the back Than stop running away and sign the paper. You graduated from the military academay in 98??? yet you still are considering joining???

quote:

Originally posted by speters53:

quote:

Originally posted by FortesFortunaJuvat:

quote:

Originally posted by Berlin93:
Ground truth. Thanks for posting it.

As General Petraeus has said -- there's no military solution to Iraq. Nobody in Iraq really is on our side and the Iraqis aren't grateful to us for anything we're doing for them.[/i]

I didn't know General Petraeus had a crystal ball. No one knows the solution or how this thing is going to play out. That being the case, I'd rather go down with guns blazing Than mount up cowboy??? You wouldn't want to be considered a CHICKENhawk would ya??? than to get shot in the back Than stop running away and sign the paper. You graduated from the military academay in 98??? yet you still are considering joining???

quote:

Originally posted by Berlin93:
Tucker Carlson says soldiers shouldn't write sentences like "a vast majority of Iraqis feel increasingly insecure and view us as an occupation force... I'm uncomfortable with it... weighing in on a political question like this squanders the awesome moral authority these guys have."

Carlson says, "to tell the American public that this is what the majority of Iraqis believe is a stretch for anybody."

Everything I've read says that the huge majority of Iraqis aren't grateful to us and think we're occupiers. 90% of the Sunnis and 62% of the Shiites approve and welcome attacks on us.

Go away, Tucker. Nobody cares.

quote:

Originally posted by areyouapatriot:
Op-Ed Contributors
The War as We Saw It

By BUDDHIKA JAYAMAHA, WESLEY D. SMITH, JEREMY ROEBUCK, OMAR MORA, EDWARD SANDMEIER, YANCE T. GRAY and JEREMY A. MURPHY
Published: August 19, 2007
Baghdad



Paul Hoppe
VIEWED from Iraq at the tail end of a 15-month deployment, the political debate in Washington is indeed surreal. Counterinsurgency is, by definition, a competition between insurgents and counterinsurgents for the control and support of a population. To believe that Americans, with an occupying force that long ago outlived its reluctant welcome, can win over a recalcitrant local population and win this counterinsurgency is far-fetched. As responsible infantrymen and noncommissioned officers with the 82nd Airborne Division soon heading back home, we are skeptical of recent press coverage portraying the conflict as increasingly manageable and feel it has neglected the mounting civil, political and social unrest we see every day. (Obviously, these are our personal views and should not be seen as official within our chain of command.)
I won't challenge these men of their service, patriotism, or dedication to the war. But what I will do is remind everybody who reads this that it is THERE opinion. And as I put in bold. They even say this shouldn't be used in the chain of command.


I also question (only because I can't find) when was there deployment? Was it a year ago? 4 years ago? I can't find anything on the when.

I want everybody to understand, before I get attacked, I have another story to tell because my Nephew has been over there twice. He doesn’t tell me the same thing as these men. So understand where I’m coming from.


The claim that we are increasingly in control of the battlefields in Iraq is an assessment arrived at through a flawed, American-centered framework. Yes, we are militarily superior, but our successes are offset by failures elsewhere. What soldiers call the “battle space” remains the same, with changes only at the margins. It is crowded with actors who do not fit neatly into boxes: Sunni extremists, Al Qaeda terrorists, Shiite militiamen, criminals and armed tribes. This situation is made more complex by the questionable loyalties and Janus-faced role of the Iraqi police and Iraqi Army, which have been trained and armed at United States taxpayers’ expense.

A few nights ago, for example, we witnessed the death of one American soldier and the critical wounding of two others when a lethal armor-piercing explosive was detonated between an Iraqi Army checkpoint and a police one. Local Iraqis readily testified to American investigators that Iraqi police and Army officers escorted the triggermen and helped plant the bomb. These civilians highlighted their own predicament: had they informed the Americans of the bomb before the incident, the Iraqi Army, the police or the local Shiite militia would have killed their families.

As many grunts will tell you, this is a near-routine event. Reports that a majority of Iraqi Army commanders are now reliable partners can be considered only misleading rhetoric. The truth is that battalion commanders, even if well meaning, have little to no influence over the thousands of obstinate men under them, in an incoherent chain of command, who are really loyal only to their militias.

Similarly, Sunnis, who have been underrepresented in the new Iraqi armed forces, now find themselves forming militias, sometimes with our tacit support. Sunnis recognize that the best guarantee they may have against Shiite militias and the Shiite-dominated government is to form their own armed bands. We arm them to aid in our fight against Al Qaeda.

However, while creating proxies is essential in winning a counterinsurgency, it requires that the proxies are loyal to the center that we claim to support. Armed Sunni tribes have indeed become effective surrogates, but the enduring question is where their loyalties would lie in our absence. The Iraqi government finds itself working at cross purposes with us on this issue because it is justifiably fearful that Sunni militias will turn on it should the Americans leave.

In short, we operate in a bewildering context of determined enemies and questionable allies, one where the balance of forces on the ground remains entirely unclear. (In the course of writing this article, this fact became all too clear: one of us, Staff Sergeant Murphy, an Army Ranger and reconnaissance team leader, was shot in the head during a “time-sensitive target acquisition mission” on Aug. 12; he is expected to survive and is being flown to a military hospital in the United States.) While we have the will and the resources to fight in this context, we are effectively hamstrung because realities on the ground require measures we will always refuse — namely, the widespread use of lethal and brutal force.

Given the situation, it is important not to assess security from an American-centered perspective. The ability of, say, American observers to safely walk down the streets of formerly violent towns is not a resounding indicator of security. What matters is the experience of the local citizenry and the future of our counterinsurgency. When we take this view, we see that a vast majority of Iraqis feel increasingly insecure and view us as an occupation force that has failed to produce normalcy after four years and is increasingly unlikely to do so as we continue to arm each warring side.

Coupling our military strategy to an insistence that the Iraqis meet political benchmarks for reconciliation is also unhelpful. The morass in the government has fueled impatience and confusion while providing no semblance of security to average Iraqis. Leaders are far from arriving at a lasting political settlement. This should not be surprising, since a lasting political solution will not be possible while the military situation remains in constant flux.

The Iraqi government is run by the main coalition partners of the Shiite-dominated United Iraqi Alliance, with Kurds as minority members. The Shiite clerical establishment formed the alliance to make sure its people did not succumb to the same mistake as in 1920: rebelling against the occupying Western force (then the British) and losing what they believed was their inherent right to rule Iraq as the majority. The qualified and reluctant welcome we received from the Shiites since the invasion has to be seen in that historical context. They saw in us something useful for the moment.

Now that moment is passing, as the Shiites have achieved what they believe is rightfully theirs. Their next task is to figure out how best to consolidate the gains, because reconciliation without consolidation risks losing it all. Washington’s insistence that the Iraqis correct the three gravest mistakes we made — de-Baathification, the dismantling of the Iraqi Army and the creation of a loose federalist system of government — places us at cross purposes with the government we have committed to support.

Political reconciliation in Iraq will occur, but not at our insistence or in ways that meet our benchmarks. It will happen on Iraqi terms when the reality on the battlefield is congruent with that in the political sphere. There will be no magnanimous solutions that please every party the way we expect, and there will be winners and losers. The choice we have left is to decide which side we will take. Trying to please every party in the conflict — as we do now — will only ensure we are hated by all in the long run.

At the same time, the most important front in the counterinsurgency, improving basic social and economic conditions, is the one on which we have failed most miserably. Two million Iraqis are in refugee camps in bordering countries. Close to two million more are internally displaced and now fill many urban slums. Cities lack regular electricity, telephone services and sanitation. “Lucky” Iraqis live in gated communities barricaded with concrete blast walls that provide them with a sense of communal claustrophobia rather than any sense of security we would consider normal.

In a lawless environment where men with guns rule the streets, engaging in the banalities of life has become a death-defying act. Four years into our occupation, we have failed on every promise, while we have substituted Baath Party tyranny with a tyranny of Islamist, militia and criminal violence. When the primary preoccupation of average Iraqis is when and how they are likely to be killed, we can hardly feel smug as we hand out care packages. As an Iraqi man told us a few days ago with deep resignation, “We need security, not free food.”

In the end, we need to recognize that our presence may have released Iraqis from the grip of a tyrant, but that it has also robbed them of their self-respect. They will soon realize that the best way to regain dignity is to call us what we are — an army of occupation — and force our withdrawal.

Until that happens, it would be prudent for us to increasingly let Iraqis take center stage in all matters, to come up with a nuanced policy in which we assist them from the margins but let them resolve their differences as they see fit. This suggestion is not meant to be defeatist, but rather to highlight our pursuit of incompatible policies to absurd ends without recognizing the incongruities.

We need not talk about our morale. As committed soldiers, we will see this mission through.


Buddhika Jayamaha is an Army specialist. Wesley D. Smith is a sergeant. Jeremy Roebuck is a sergeant. Omar Mora is a sergeant. Edward Sandmeier is a sergeant. Yance T. Gray is a staff sergeant. Jeremy A. Murphy is a staff sergeant.

quote:

Originally posted by comingofage:

quote:

Originally posted by Berlin93:
This is sure to infuriate the cheerleaders in the 101st Chairborne. Do they have the nerve to ratchet up the smear machine against these soldiers. Do they have the balls? They don’t -- they'll try to ignore the op-ed completely.

quote:

Originally posted by comingofage:
Tomcatt; this is a copy thread? I didn't know that. If you don't mind, where's the first one. I would like to take a gander at the posts and possible links.

quote:

Originally posted by Tomcatt:

quote:

Originally posted by Berlin93:
This is sure to infuriate the cheerleaders in the 101st Chairborne. Do they have the nerve to ratchet up the smear machine against these soldiers. Do they have the balls? They don’t -- they'll try to ignore the op-ed completely.

Chairborne? I did not know you had been there, what was your take on how things on the ground are?

Many others have posted on the first thread on this topic, and may not feel the need to post in an exact copy thread.

I will state that they are junior NCOs who do have some valid points, but are also talking above thier probably level of view. you discounted this in the other thread, and go on to quote their writings on the what is going on in the heads of IA Bn commanders. First you discount my Senior NCO boots on the ground opinion, then you prove my point for me.

I do not disagree with all they have said, I do disagree woth some of thier conclusions.

quote:

Originally posted by comingofage:

quote:

Originally posted by areyouapatriot:
Op-Ed Contributors
The War as We Saw It

By BUDDHIKA JAYAMAHA, WESLEY D. SMITH, JEREMY ROEBUCK, OMAR MORA, EDWARD SANDMEIER, YANCE T. GRAY and JEREMY A. MURPHY
Published: August 19, 2007
Baghdad



Paul Hoppe
VIEWED from Iraq at the tail end of a 15-month deployment, the political debate in Washington is indeed surreal. Counterinsurgency is, by definition, a competition between insurgents and counterinsurgents for the control and support of a population. To believe that Americans, with an occupying force that long ago outlived its reluctant welcome, can win over a recalcitrant local population and win this counterinsurgency is far-fetched. As responsible infantrymen and noncommissioned officers with the 82nd Airborne Division soon heading back home, we are skeptical of recent press coverage portraying the conflict as increasingly manageable and feel it has neglected the mounting civil, political and social unrest we see every day. (Obviously, these are our personal views and should not be seen as official within our chain of command.)
I won't challenge these men of their service, patriotism, or dedication to the war. But what I will do is remind everybody who reads this that it is THERE opinion. And as I put in bold. They even say this shouldn't be used in the chain of command.


I also question (only because I can't find) when was there deployment? Was it a year ago? 4 years ago? I can't find anything on the when.

I want everybody to understand, before I get attacked, I have another story to tell because my Nephew has been over there twice. He doesn’t tell me the same thing as these men. So understand where I’m coming from.


The claim that we are increasingly in control of the battlefields in Iraq is an assessment arrived at through a flawed, American-centered framework. Yes, we are militarily superior, but our successes are offset by failures elsewhere. What soldiers call the “battle space” remains the same, with changes only at the margins. It is crowded with actors who do not fit neatly into boxes: Sunni extremists, Al Qaeda terrorists, Shiite militiamen, criminals and armed tribes. This situation is made more complex by the questionable loyalties and Janus-faced role of the Iraqi police and Iraqi Army, which have been trained and armed at United States taxpayers’ expense.

A few nights ago, for example, we witnessed the death of one American soldier and the critical wounding of two others when a lethal armor-piercing explosive was detonated between an Iraqi Army checkpoint and a police one. Local Iraqis readily testified to American investigators that Iraqi police and Army officers escorted the triggermen and helped plant the bomb. These civilians highlighted their own predicament: had they informed the Americans of the bomb before the incident, the Iraqi Army, the police or the local Shiite militia would have killed their families.

As many grunts will tell you, this is a near-routine event. Reports that a majority of Iraqi Army commanders are now reliable partners can be considered only misleading rhetoric. The truth is that battalion commanders, even if well meaning, have little to no influence over the thousands of obstinate men under them, in an incoherent chain of command, who are really loyal only to their militias.

Similarly, Sunnis, who have been underrepresented in the new Iraqi armed forces, now find themselves forming militias, sometimes with our tacit support. Sunnis recognize that the best guarantee they may have against Shiite militias and the Shiite-dominated government is to form their own armed bands. We arm them to aid in our fight against Al Qaeda.

However, while creating proxies is essential in winning a counterinsurgency, it requires that the proxies are loyal to the center that we claim to support. Armed Sunni tribes have indeed become effective surrogates, but the enduring question is where their loyalties would lie in our absence. The Iraqi government finds itself working at cross purposes with us on this issue because it is justifiably fearful that Sunni militias will turn on it should the Americans leave.

In short, we operate in a bewildering context of determined enemies and questionable allies, one where the balance of forces on the ground remains entirely unclear. (In the course of writing this article, this fact became all too clear: one of us, Staff Sergeant Murphy, an Army Ranger and reconnaissance team leader, was shot in the head during a “time-sensitive target acquisition mission” on Aug. 12; he is expected to survive and is being flown to a military hospital in the United States.) While we have the will and the resources to fight in this context, we are effectively hamstrung because realities on the ground require measures we will always refuse — namely, the widespread use of lethal and brutal force.

Given the situation, it is important not to assess security from an American-centered perspective. The ability of, say, American observers to safely walk down the streets of formerly violent towns is not a resounding indicator of security. What matters is the experience of the local citizenry and the future of our counterinsurgency. When we take this view, we see that a vast majority of Iraqis feel increasingly insecure and view us as an occupation force that has failed to produce normalcy after four years and is increasingly unlikely to do so as we continue to arm each warring side.

Coupling our military strategy to an insistence that the Iraqis meet political benchmarks for reconciliation is also unhelpful. The morass in the government has fueled impatience and confusion while providing no semblance of security to average Iraqis. Leaders are far from arriving at a lasting political settlement. This should not be surprising, since a lasting political solution will not be possible while the military situation remains in constant flux.

The Iraqi government is run by the main coalition partners of the Shiite-dominated United Iraqi Alliance, with Kurds as minority members. The Shiite clerical establishment formed the alliance to make sure its people did not succumb to the same mistake as in 1920: rebelling against the occupying Western force (then the British) and losing what they believed was their inherent right to rule Iraq as the majority. The qualified and reluctant welcome we received from the Shiites since the invasion has to be seen in that historical context. They saw in us something useful for the moment.

Now that moment is passing, as the Shiites have achieved what they believe is rightfully theirs. Their next task is to figure out how best to consolidate the gains, because reconciliation without consolidation risks losing it all. Washington’s insistence that the Iraqis correct the three gravest mistakes we made — de-Baathification, the dismantling of the Iraqi Army and the creation of a loose federalist system of government — places us at cross purposes with the government we have committed to support.

Political reconciliation in Iraq will occur, but not at our insistence or in ways that meet our benchmarks. It will happen on Iraqi terms when the reality on the battlefield is congruent with that in the political sphere. There will be no magnanimous solutions that please every party the way we expect, and there will be winners and losers. The choice we have left is to decide which side we will take. Trying to please every party in the conflict — as we do now — will only ensure we are hated by all in the long run.

At the same time, the most important front in the counterinsurgency, improving basic social and economic conditions, is the one on which we have failed most miserably. Two million Iraqis are in refugee camps in bordering countries. Close to two million more are internally displaced and now fill many urban slums. Cities lack regular electricity, telephone services and sanitation. “Lucky” Iraqis live in gated communities barricaded with concrete blast walls that provide them with a sense of communal claustrophobia rather than any sense of security we would consider normal.

In a lawless environment where men with guns rule the streets, engaging in the banalities of life has become a death-defying act. Four years into our occupation, we have failed on every promise, while we have substituted Baath Party tyranny with a tyranny of Islamist, militia and criminal violence. When the primary preoccupation of average Iraqis is when and how they are likely to be killed, we can hardly feel smug as we hand out care packages. As an Iraqi man told us a few days ago with deep resignation, “We need security, not free food.”

In the end, we need to recognize that our presence may have released Iraqis from the grip of a tyrant, but that it has also robbed them of their self-respect. They will soon realize that the best way to regain dignity is to call us what we are — an army of occupation — and force our withdrawal.

Until that happens, it would be prudent for us to increasingly let Iraqis take center stage in all matters, to come up with a nuanced policy in which we assist them from the margins but let them resolve their differences as they see fit. This suggestion is not meant to be defeatist, but rather to highlight our pursuit of incompatible policies to absurd ends without recognizing the incongruities.

We need not talk about our morale. As committed soldiers, we will see this mission through.


Buddhika Jayamaha is an Army specialist. Wesley D. Smith is a sergeant. Jeremy Roebuck is a sergeant. Omar Mora is a sergeant. Edward Sandmeier is a sergeant. Yance T. Gray is a staff sergeant. Jeremy A. Murphy is a staff sergeant.

I've read this article 3 times. Something just feels odd about them. I check on line and there must be a hundred different sites blowing it around. The first 4 pages of sites were left wing. Now I understand why but if you read this closely you will see a lot of anti-war talking points.

I would like to find out and or ask somebody who knows; How much of these men’s story were edited and spun by the Michel Moore types. If anybody can find a link that can help make sure these words are "ALL" theirs, I would greatly appreciate it.

Again, I choose my words wisely because I have total respect for our fighting men and will never take anything away from what they do for me and this country.

quote:

Originally posted by mainedawg:
I contacted a 1SG of the 82nd Airborne in Iraq about this artical. I will post a short part of his reply now and later I will post the whole e-mail.

The 1SG: I am ashamed of the fact that they claim to be from the 82nd Airborne Division and and used the NY Times as a voice.
I have fowarded this artical to the Command Sergeant Major of the 82nd Airborne.

We will have the rest of the story from them in a few days.

quote:

Originally posted by mainedawg:
I don't understand why NCO's would go to the New York Times and post those comments.

quote:

Originally posted by Berlin93:

quote:

Originally posted by Tomcatt:

quote:

Originally posted by Berlin93:
This is sure to infuriate the cheerleaders in the 101st Chairborne. Do they have the nerve to ratchet up the smear machine against these soldiers. Do they have the balls? They don’t -- they'll try to ignore the op-ed completely.

Chairborne? I did not know you had been there, what was your take on how things on the ground are?

Many others have posted on the first thread on this topic, and may not feel the need to post in an exact copy thread.

I will state that they are junior NCOs who do have some valid points, but are also talking above thier probably level of view. you discounted this in the other thread, and go on to quote their writings on the what is going on in the heads of IA Bn commanders. First you discount my Senior NCO boots on the ground opinion, then you prove my point for me.

I do not disagree with all they have said, I do disagree woth some of thier conclusions.

Why do you think I was referring to you?

I was referring to the group better known as the 101st Fighting Keyboardists. The guys like Ben Ferguson and Jonah Goldberg who think Iraq is an excellent adventure and say they have "friends in Iraq" but wouldn't think of joining the military themselves.

Calm down.

quote:

Originally posted by Berlin93:

quote:

Originally posted by comingofage:

I won't challenge these men of their service, patriotism, or dedication to the war. But what I will do is remind everybody who reads this that it is THERE opinion. And as I put in bold. They even say this shouldn't be used in the chain of command.


I also question (only because I can't find) when was there deployment? Was it a year ago? 4 years ago? I can't find anything on the when.

I want everybody to understand, before I get attacked, I have another story to tell because my Nephew has been over there twice. He doesn’t tell me the same thing as these men. So understand where I’m coming from.

I've read this article 3 times. Something just feels odd about them. I check on line and there must be a hundred different sites blowing it around. The first 4 pages of sites were left wing. Now I understand why but if you read this closely you will see a lot of anti-war talking points.

I would like to find out and or ask somebody who knows; How much of these men’s story were edited and spun by the Michel Moore types. If anybody can find a link that can help make sure these words are "ALL" theirs, I would greatly appreciate it.

Again, I choose my words wisely because I have total respect for our fighting men and will never take anything away from what they do for me and this country.

I hear the smear machine warming up.

What are the "anti-war talking points" you think you see?

Why do you say, "How much of these men’s story were edited and spun by the Michel Moore types."? Why do you think a half dozen 82nd NCOs and a SPC can't write an article about what they saw in Iraq on their own?

Those guys are over there right now.

quote:

Originally posted by comingofage:

I won't challenge these men of their service, patriotism, or dedication to the war. But what I will do is remind everybody who reads this that it is THERE opinion. And as I put in bold. They even say this shouldn't be used in the chain of command.


I also question (only because I can't find) when was there deployment? Was it a year ago? 4 years ago? I can't find anything on the when.

I want everybody to understand, before I get attacked, I have another story to tell because my Nephew has been over there twice. He doesn’t tell me the same thing as these men. So understand where I’m coming from.

I've read this article 3 times. Something just feels odd about them. I check on line and there must be a hundred different sites blowing it around. The first 4 pages of sites were left wing. Now I understand why but if you read this closely you will see a lot of anti-war talking points.

I would like to find out and or ask somebody who knows; How much of these men’s story were edited and spun by the Michel Moore types. If anybody can find a link that can help make sure these words are "ALL" theirs, I would greatly appreciate it.

Again, I choose my words wisely because I have total respect for our fighting men and will never take anything away from what they do for me and this country.

quote:

Originally posted by mainedawg:
I contacted a 1SG of the 82nd Airborne in Iraq about this artical. I will post a short part of his reply now and later I will post the whole e-mail.

The 1SG: I am ashamed of the fact that they claim to be from the 82nd Airborne Division and and used the NY Times as a voice.
I have fowarded this artical to the Command Sergeant Major of the 82nd Airborne.

We will have the rest of the story from them in a few days.

quote:

Originally posted by centra:
Ok let's get serious here. You bet things will get worst once you decide to fight back. Just look at America and her revolutionary war. It wasn't until people started fighting back against the Brits that the American patriots ranks started to grow. Once the two sides began to fight, people chose sides. It takes two parties to fight a war. It's time we got serious.