guys, just came across this on another forum:


Introduction
Today’s maritime threat environment is evolving in dramatic ways, especially in the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean (IO) is the third largest water body in the world and borders nearly three dozen states, covering around 73.6 million sq km. The jugular vein of global maritime trade cuts right through the IO, including the critically strategic energy shipment routes running into the nucleus of the Arabian Gulf. Because of the increasing strategic importance of the IO, a naval build-up with submarine proliferation as a growing trend is quietly occurring.

The advent of new and resurgent powers into global power politics is making submarines essential assets for naval inventories in a growing number of nations. Submarines are significantly more difficult to neutralize than other platforms with their ability to move evasively and strike with devastating effects. Moreover, because submarines offer both an offensive and defensive capability, they represent a powerfully versatile platform to their operators. They can be a launch platform for torpedoes, cruise and ballistic missiles – delivering conventional or nuclear-tipped warheads to targets on land, at sea, or in the air. They would also likely be platforms of choice to deliver reported new technologies such as supersonic torpedoes.

Historically speaking, submarines belonged to the domain of blue-water Western maritime nations and as such were a potent symbol of their naval power. What made submarines such an obvious symbol of military potency was not just the need to have them or the capacity to construct them, but the sophisticated missile and nuclear-weapons capabilities that made them indispensible force multipliers. However, the Indian Ocean may be about to witness a naval arms race in the region at the heart of which is submarine proliferation. Now possessing increasingly sophisticated missile arsenals, emerging military powers like China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and Iran have come to view underwater boats as increasingly high value requirements for their naval forces.

There are three basic drivers behind a greater number of maritime nations around the world fervently pursuing submarine acquisitions. Firstly, the era of global trade and critical dependence on imported energy has raised the stakes at sea for rapidly growing economies –these nations increasingly sense vulnerability to strategic competitors who may employ naval blockades to deny access to critical SLOCs in the event of potential conflict. Secondly, the need to be able to exercise sovereignty over extended territories has placed new capability demands on naval forces, especially for energy exporting nations with offshore oil- and gas-fields. Lastly, as sophisticated missile technology and air and missile defenses are becoming accessible to a growing number of nations – thereby threatening existing balances of power – military strategists have begun looking to alternative platforms that extend their reach against strategic competitors.

Submarine Proliferation
Transparency around Chinese naval modernization is not much different to the secrecy surrounding its wider modern military. Estimates on how many submarines the People’s Liberation Army Navy currently holds average around sixty, including between ten and twenty nuclear-powered submarines. Its current focus appears on nuclear ballistic missile submarines with one Type-092 SSBN and three Type-094 SSBNs – both tasked with nuclear deterrence missions – armed with six torpedo tubes (533mm) and twelve JL-1A SLBMs already operating – at least three more of the latter SSBN are currently being built and are expected to eventually number six or possibly eight. The Type-096 SSBNs, which are still under development, are expected to carry twice as many SLBMs. Of the third-generation nuclear attack submarines, at least three Type-093 SSNs have been built (this number expected to double) and designs for the Type-095 SSN (a potential escort for future carrier-groups) is under development – both are likely to be armed with the long-range anti-ship cruise missiles (such as the HY-4). Other than this there are perhaps three dozen mainly Soviet-designed second-generation submarines of various classes commonly fitted with six torpedo tubes (533mm), anti-ship missiles (C-801), and able to carry between two and three dozen mines (ten Kilo-class are also equipped with SAMs).

The Indian Navy currently operates sixteen conventional submarines, four to seven of which will be retired by 2012. The Indians are awaiting delivery of six Scorpene-class SSK submarines built in India, which are armed with the Exocet SM39 anti-ship missile and carry either eighteen torpedoes or thirty naval mines delivered through six tubes (533mm). The first Scorpene originally due for delivery in 2012 has been delayed due to problems in absorption of technology and industrial capacity. India is also awaiting delivery of two Akula-II class SSBNs on 10-year leases from the Russians (the deal includes a buy-out option) but the first of these (INS Chakra) due in September 2009 was delayed following Indian demands for further trials after 20-crew were accidentally killed onboard during earlier trials. Although the Akula-II submarines Russia operates are armed with twenty-eight nuclear-capable cruise missiles with a range of 3,000km, arms control restrictions mean the two Indian-leased versions are expected to be armed with the 3M-54 Klub nuclear-capable cruise missiles which have a 300 km range (India retrofitting the nuclear-capable Sangrika SLBM onto the platform by itself is unlikely). India’s indigenously developed Arihant-class SSBNs – five of which are planned under the indigenous Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) program – will however be weaponized with Sangrika giving India a retaliatory nuclear strike capability. The ATV program, behind schedule, is however unlikely to meet its originally planned delivery date of 2012. Other than this: Ten Indian Sindughosh-class submarines (a variant of the Russian Kilo-class) with six torpedo tubes can fire either eighteen heavyweight torpedoes (twelve on racks with rapid reload) or be armed with twenty-four mines, and come equipped with eight SAMs; Two German-designed Type-209 Shishumar-class armed with fourteen torpedoes and twenty-four strap-on mines, and; Two aging Foxtrot-class submarines with two torpedo tubes (533mm) capable of launching twenty-two torpedoes.

The Pakistan Navy currently operates six submarines and is planning the acquisition of three more submarines – possibly the German-designed U-214 – once its two Agosta-70 submarines currently in service are retired. The Pakistan Navy recently inducted a forth Agosta-90B submarine (the first submarine in the Arabian Sea fitted with an air-independent propulsion [AIP] system), built completely in Pakistan. All Pakistani boats can launch sixteen torpedoes through four tubes (550mm) and are armed with the Exocet SM39 anti-ship missile. They may be armed with a variant of the nuclear-capable Babur land attack cruise missile in the future.

The Israeli Navy now operates five AIP-fitted Dolphin-class submarines, considered among the most capable conventional submarines in the world and the most expensive platform in their military arsenal. In September 2009, Israel toke delivery of two new German-built upgraded Dolphin-class submarines and is reportedly interested in purchasing a third. The three older boats are armed with six torpedo tubes (533mm) capable of firing Harpoon anti-ship missiles while the latest deliveries come with four larger torpedo tubes (648mm) suspected to be capable of launching the nuclear-tipped Popeye Turbo cruise missiles which have a range 1,500 km. The submarines can also deploy mines.

The Iranian Navy operates a total of eleven submarines, including; At least three confirmed Russian Kilo-class attack submarines which are, as one of the quietest diesel submarines ever built, the jewels of its fleet and; Seven Ghadir-class and one Nahang-class midget submarines, all indigenously built – given these are indigenous programs and designed for an anti-shipping role their numbers are likely to expand. The Ghadir-class boats have two torpedo tubes and can reportedly launch missiles simultaneously – few details exist on precise weapons – but as primarily a mine-laying platform it can probably deploy at least 8-16 mines per sortie. The Nahang-class, which is wider and has a greater tonnage than the Ghadir-class (and thus presumably carries either more or heavier mines) is designed for a clandestine mine-laying role but may be able to launch an ambush torpedo attack (possibly giving it an ASW capability). The Kilo-class submarines are much the same as those operated by China and India.

The focus of Indian efforts is a blue-water power projection in the face of a China that appears well on course for consolidating its naval superiority amongst regional states. The underlying objectives for both are to secure critical SLOCs by offering an offensive conventional deterrent as well as buttressing strategic second-strike capabilities. Pakistan’s focus continues to be India-centric and based around deterring an Indian naval blockade in the event of conflict, but may soon turn to developing a strategic second-strike capability given archrival India’s expected acquisition of such. Israel’s focus is on an offensive pre-emptive and strategic second-strike capability but could also enforce an effective naval blockade against outbound energy shipments from Iran or even GCC states. The Iranian focus is centered on an anti-shipping capability (i.e., being able to rapidly mine key SLOCs) but would presumably look to a second-strike capability if it became a nuclear-weapons state.

Consequences of an Expanded Underwater Battle-Space
The implications of these trends vary according to sub-region specific factors. Western nations with significant naval presence in the region such as the United States and France will likely maintain superiority undersea for some time yet despite submarine proliferation in the region. But the developments will have an obvious operational impact: The IO is an overlapping area of operations for both the U.S. Central Command (headquartered in Manama, Bahrain) and U.S. Pacific Command area of operations, and the U.S. – which currently possesses more naval vessels than the rest of the world combined – maintains its major regional military base on the island Diego García, part of the British Indian Ocean Territories off the southern coast of India. Alternatively, France has around a dozen island territories scattered around the southern IO and numerous bases – including a naval HQ at La Réunion, off the east coast of Africa and the new ‘Peace Camp’ in Abu Dhabi – an area of operation covered by a dedicated command of the French joint forces.

Where submarines have been acquired from Western companies, they would have been sold to friendly states but in any case are unlikely to significantly alter the balance of power beyond a tactical level vis-à-vis western forces. On the other hand, while indigenously developed vessels are comparable to technologies the West has possessed for decades, the Chinese in particular may be making technological strides. It is however unlikely that Chinese or Indian programs will catch up with the sophistication levels of Western technology for at least another the two decades. Having said that, Russian willingness to cooperate with Beijing can provide access to technical expertise in a number of areas and could save years in research and development.

Submarine fleets require a great level of skill to operate with effectiveness, and with decades of experience under their belts Western maritime nations possess an important and distinct advantage over new operators. This human factor can however render technological advantages irrelevant to some degree as well on occasion, as evidenced by the Chinese Type-039 attack submarine that evaded an entire American carrier-group conducting exercises in the Pacific Ocean a couple of years ago.

On a regional level, the implications are quite different and measurable on strategic lines. In fact, the recent acquisitions of submarines may already have kick-started a naval arms race in the region. The cost of developing submarine capabilities will be increasingly felt over the coming decades and add burdens on already inflating budgets – particularly for their knock-on effects. For nations with submarines as well as those without, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities are rapidly ascending to high priority concerns. This will mean requirements not only for more numbers of dedicated ASW-tasked frigates and helicopters – and probably helo-carriers for the likes of China and India – but also for more surface-based platforms to be equipped with anti-air systems to defend these assets. Thus submarines are likely to create needs for expanded surface fleets. Anti-ship and anti-air missiles launched from multiple platforms will be decisive in the new naval balance of power, as will the sophistication of electronic warfare (EW) capabilities such as communications jamming devices. These needs are likely to pave the way for greater use of unmanned aerial vehicles in the maritime domain –which can have a role in Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), ASW, or EW – as well as the adoption of new technologies such as laser-based communication systems.

For Arab Gulf states these developments are likely to be perceived anxiously and will throw up new dilemmas. This is because regional naval forces focused increasingly on power projection capabilities have the effect of complicating the threat environment. While Arab Gulf states maintain friendly relations with all regional powers barring Israel, they will nonetheless be compelled to expand their capabilities in order to maintain an effective credible deterrence. Gulf states have overlooked submarine acquisition until now because Gulf waters are seen to be too shallow for most submarines to operate, although midget submarines (like the Iranian Ghadir-class) and other small-sized vessels (like the French Andrasta-class) can operate with some useful degree of effectiveness – their small, stealthy designs give a low acoustic signature which makes hard for detection even in shallow waters. Another limiting factor for smaller GCC states may have been the manpower burden submarine fleets would exert, especially as even intensive crew-training can take around three years.

For reasons of practicality, GCC states have opted so far to bolster ASW capabilities on existing surface vessels that include new anti-torpedo countermeasures to reduce vulnerability to submarine attack. In the next five years however it is entirely plausible that a GCC state makes the purchase of a small-sized submarine to fulfill an ASW and intelligence-gathering role in the Arab Gulf and Arabian Sea. Besides the obvious interest in enhanced ASW and EW capabilities, procurements for airborne platforms that can detect and engage surface vessels at larger distances could also be serious acquisition considerations. More immediately, the need for mine countermeasure capabilities will be magnified. Anti-missile shields will continue to be a central part of national defenses and early airborne warning will likely be a growing concern within these.

Cooperation with all players in the region will be probably be more important than expanding naval force capabilities for Arab Gulf states per se. While much of the naval build up in the region is inadvertently based around the geo-strategic importance of sustaining maritime access to the resource-rich Arabian Gulf, the coming challenge for Arabian Gulf leaderships will be to keep out of the emerging regional power competition and to keep the competition out of the Gulf, without upsetting anyone in particular. But one trend is clear for the region, submarine proliferation is not just a sign of a naval build-up in the region – it is at the heart of it.