quote:

Originally posted by SgtJSPaul:
RE: http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,182717,00.html

One concern that I see regarding the push for lighter weight on the vehicles is a simple scientific fact: stronger and lighter does NOT necessarily mean "safer".

For example, let's visualize a hypothetical vehicle of the exact same size and general configuration, but due to scientific miracles weighs only ten pounds. Its strength is such that it is nearly impossible to dent it with high explosives. Three men are aboard it when it triggers a land mine.
Due to the ten pound weight, the truck, if empty, would be vaulted hundreds of feet into the air, slowed primarily by air resistance, like a sheet of paper.(Actually, it would only go twenty or thirty feet up, but do it in a couple thousandths of a second).
But the men inside are subject to much greater acceleration forces than would be the case in a vehicle of normal heavy weight, since the lighter truck offers only 10 lb of resistance; they absorb over 95% of the entire force of the blast, even though they are inside an "indestructible" vehicle.
So the truck comes down visually undamaged with globs of jelled soldiers inside.
Yes, this is a rediculous extreme, but the principle is shown that to be blast resistant alone is not enough to protect those inside. Higher strength is mandated, but the weight is still needed to absorb the shock energy generated by high explosives.
Basic physics.

quote:

Originally posted by 19591240:
The problem with equipping the military today is that their mission requirements are wide ranging... from police actions to conventional warfare. Each, type of combat role or mission requires mission specific equipment and manpower skills. However, the military remains locked into the standard configuration for TO&E's.

A better approach would be to rethink the force structure and create units for the various types of missions. The use of standard templates for force structures has lead to units designed with manpower and equipment requirements for a specific mission being used for missions they were not intended. Hence, we see Engineers/Sappers, mixed in with artillery, mechanic's, cooks and clerks manning HUMVEE's, performing convoy escort duties and limited police actions in Iraq.

The Engineers and Artillery men, may be somewhat prepared, equiped and trained for such duties but mechanic's cooks and clerks should not be performing these duties... they are not MOS qualified nor properly trained on the necessary equipment for these roles. The military may want to rethink it's role for light infantry and military police; too, re-configure new units for police actions and convoy escort duty.

Such units would be manpower and equipment specific (equiped with MARP's); contain the MOS's and EQUIPMENT in the correct configurations and numbers for the mission. These new units would be designated for insurgency and police actions... being specifically tailored for these roles with equipment and manpower. It appears that the military will be taking on these types of mission well into the future... let us therefore, rethink TO&E's for these missions.

Not every unit needs the MARP! Taking, conventional war TO&E's (HEAVY and LIGHT DIVISION TO&E's) and reconfiguring them for light combat and police actions is a waste of force structure... manpower, and equipment. Such, non-sense lead to a debacle and the unnecessary loss of life and equipment too units forced to assume missions they were not equipped or trained to perform.

The MARP may be a good idea for terrorist intervention and light duty combat. However, this vehicle will not fair well as a general purpose utility vehicle for conventional war. The MARP's cost, weight, and ability to support the general purpose utility role needed in a conventional war are questionable. There initial cost will limit its numbers, and it's ease of maintinance and ability to be readily transported from theator to theator are questionable. The development of such vehicles as a general purpose vehicle, for use in many configurations, will result in mission compromises that make the vehicle less than desirable for conventional war missions.

It is past time that the military rethink how it mans and equips units based on the new missions it is routinely assigned. Using, the current templates created for conventional warfare, with modifications, may appear cost effective; but, in the long run they end up costing more in lives and materiel.

RA Nelson

Col. US Army (Ret)

quote:

Originally posted by 15639111:
Having recently returned from from Iraq I can say that the current MRAP is indead too heavy for its intended theater of operation. We had several roads (mostly along cannals) give out under the weight of the vehicle, once such incedent resulting in a death. It is also too tall for urban movement in many of the small towns. We had an E6 get injured when a low power line snagged on the gunners hatch. It also too wide for many of the very narrow ally's and streets in many of these towns. Our gun trucks consisted of 3 MRAP's and one Hummer. The puropse for the hummer was because had a need to go down some these areas and the MRAP just woundn't fit.

I do have to agree with Co. Nelson that cooks and clerks are not trained well enough to carry out these missions as effectivly as say an 11B. The problem is man power. Yes enlistmant may be up, but most poeple are not joining for 11B or 13B. They are becoming cooks, fuelers, 88M, or mechanics. Job they think, and the recruiters often tell them, will never see combat. However that is another topic.

To get back on track, the current MRAP is just too big to be truly usefull and effective for around 30% of the areas in Iraq.

I did however really enjoy the much improved A/C system in the vehicle.