RE: http://www.military.com/opinion/0,15202,165093,00.html
I never was a tank fan. It only takes one infantry person to knock out an Abrams tank. The Abrams is too wide to go down the goat trails of Iraq or NATO countries. No matter how hard military planners wish to substitute an iron clad weapons platform for the infantry- grunts will win or loose the war. The North Vietnamese army kicked our butts even-though the USA owned the sky. Why are we still talking about massive armor platforms when grunts can take out tanks. We need to bring our troops home and let Iraq have their civil war while the world sits on the sidelines. The USA has no strategic need beyond our border. SEMPER FI AND GOD BLESS AMERICA

Even though I'm an armor guy, I grew up in cavalry units. By nature, they are almost combined arms. The one thing I always wished for was more infantry. Armor and infantry (as well as (aviation, artillery, logistics, etc) are not mutually exclusive, but symbiotic. Can't have one without the others. Unfortunately, too many in the Army are parochial and fail to realize that fact.

The Abrams tank is a very good tank for what it was intended to do: survive and kill on the armored battlefield. In that respect, it owes its heritage more to the German Tiger tank than to the Mark IVH tank.

Our own George S. Patton, after observing both the French light tank and the British heavy tank in action during World War I, believed that a mix of light and heavy tanks (say 2 to 1 ratio) would be the most effective armored force. 70-odd years later, the development of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, with its infantry element, finally gave the U.S. military the components needed to fulfill Patton's vision.

Perhaps if the U.S. Army dropped the idea of separate tank and infantry battalions, and merged the Abrams and Bradleys at the platoon level (say 4 Abrams + 8 Bradleys (holding 2 squads of infantry) = 1 armored platoon), the operational mobility + tactical strength issues could be most effectively balanced.

We should organize as we fight. Replace the purely armor and mech infantry battalions with combined arms battalions. Doug Macgregor suggested this in 1997 in Breaking the Phalanx, which irritated all the brass and finished his career. The Abrams has its place, as does the Bradley and the Stryker. Imagination is lacking in the leadership, as I saw over my 29 year career.

quote:

Originally posted by AGBrina:
The Abrams tank is a very good tank for what it was intended to do: survive and kill on the armored battlefield. In that respect, it owes its heritage more to the German Tiger tank than to the Mark IVH tank.

Our own George S. Patton, after observing both the French light tank and the British heavy tank in action during World War I, believed that a mix of light and heavy tanks (say 2 to 1 ratio) would be the most effective armored force. 70-odd years later, the development of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, with its infantry element, finally gave the U.S. military the components needed to fulfill Patton's vision.

Perhaps if the U.S. Army dropped the idea of separate tank and infantry battalions, and merged the Abrams and Bradleys at the platoon level (say 4 Abrams + 8 Bradleys (holding 2 squads of infantry) = 1 armored platoon), the operational mobility + tactical strength issues could be most effectively balanced.

Agreed Captain...
Patton and Rommel are still...IMO...the two best tank tacticians that ever lived...

Unfortunately...there are those that do not know how to properly implement armored divisions based upon logistics and battle field conditions...

quote:

Originally posted by MichaelJKeenan:
We should organize as we fight. Replace the purely armor and mech infantry battalions with combined arms battalion.

Actually, they have in most units. The heavy BCT battalions are task org with two inf and two armor companies, and an engineer company. Stryker units are starting to get the AGS within the battalions, but it is in its still being worked.

quote:

Originally posted by SheepdogA39:

quote:

RE: http://www.military.com/opinion/0,15202,165093,00.html
I never was a tank fan. It only takes one infantry person to knock out an Abrams tank.

A. Tanks operate in at least twos, or with a Bradley, and...

B. When your lone infantryman can be relied upon to destroy T-72s at a 10-1 ratio, I'll be impressed.

You also say the NVA kicked our butts.

Man...you are so, so wrong with that whole post.
The Corps endeavors to divorce Marines from the very just and natural terror a human should feel when being steam rolled by Armor. In your case it seems they were very successful. As long you don't get steam rolled in the future, your conditioning should remain intact.

Well, he has a point even if he mixes up this and that. (BTW: The NVA kicked our butts in one symbolic sense - they would keep fighting no matter what happend, or how many times we beat them in the field)

But he didn't read the last paragraphs of Linds article...

quote:

Operational art is practiced on the mental and moral levels of war as great sweeps of armored formations deep in the enemy's rear become militarily meaningless.

But history remains important as a history of how people thought through the problems of earlier times. On Armor offers that history of armored warfare better than any other book on the subject.

The legitimate point that he has, is technology has made armour obsolete, if not today then tommorow. Right now you can get a hand held missle launcher, for a cost of 1K and take out a piece of armour than cost ten megs. The math is decisive, which it usually is in war.

In WW II, you could do it with a bazzoka, but you had to be really, really close. Today? Tomorrow?

Dave

People should read the many posts by Lind regarding tactics, armament and material. He makes many cogent points if people understand the differences between Generational Warfare and the tactics employed in each.

The mindset of most members of the Brass Fraternity lies within the realm of Second Generational Warfare when we are, and have indeed been fighting Fourth Generational wars since Vietnam (some would lump Korea in the bunch). As long as we maintain such a mindset, we will be doomed to fight wars such as we saw in Vietnam and we now see in Iraq and Afghanistan. One need only look to Russia and its experience in Afghanistan to understand the difference in Generational Warfare.

Despite the fact Russia had in excess of 500,000 troops in Afghanistan, massive armor and air support, and were brutal to boot, with our help they were defeated. Defeated by employing Fourth Generational Warfare tactics. Not tanks, not artillery, not even air power but by men on the ground utilizing sophisticated weaponry to destroy the technical wizardry of the Russians.

We face the same situation in Iraq. We send these behemoths out into the fray and they are easy pickings for the enemy. Shape formed explosive devices, explosive compounds have been the bane of our military. And effective without the enemy having to show themselves. Sad to say but our enemy has it right and we have it wrong.

Now, if we could trust our Iraqi friends, we would obtain better results utilizing clandestine operations ala the Phoenix Program or something similar. Sad part is, and I feel confident in saying this; the enemy would probably know our every move in such operations as the Iraqi military and police are riddled with informants, consequently such a program may not be very effective in a place like Iraq. But large static positions, patrols by tanks, MRAPS, HumVee's, Strykers and such don't stand a chance against a well concealed and determined enemy...we're just big bulls eye's. What the Russians got dished out to them in Afghanistan is exactly what is being dished out to us in Iraq...and we all know what happened with the Russians.

A lot of the money being spent on weapons systems should be diverted to the development and production of items that will protect the man on the ground. There is a lot of good stuff out there if only they would fund the research better and more robustly.

S/F Gordon